Dispatch Japan

Noda and Futenma

Some unofficial diplomacy in Washington over the next two weeks should provide clues as to how the Noda and Obama administrations will approach deadlocked plans to realign the US Marine presence on Okinawa.

The best bet: A new Marine air station envisioned for the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa will not be built, and the existing Futenma air station will remain open until enough time has elapsed for the two sides to take a fresh look at the whole issue.

The diplomacy kicks off today (September 7) with a seminar on the US-Japan alliance since 3-11, co-sponsored by the Stimson Center and the Sasegawa Peace Foundation. The keynote speakers will be Seiji Maehara, recently named by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to be policy chief for the ruling Democratic Party (DPJ), and Senator Jim Webb, a former US Navy secretary and a decorated Marine officer who has rankled the Pentagon with his strong opposition to the Henoko plan.

Two weeks later, on September 19, Prof. Mike Mochizuki of George Washington University will host a conference on Okinawa that will feature a presentation by Hirokazu Nakaima, governor of Okinawa prefecture. Nakaima continues to voice strong opposition to the Henoko plan.

     DEADLOCK IN TOKYO: In Tokyo, Noda’s new administration shows no inclination to invest the enormous political and financial capital that would be required for even a hope of winning Okinawan acquiescence. The new prime minister has huge tasks on his agenda, including reconstruction of the devastated Tohoku region, resolving the Fukushima nuclear emergency, tackling the nation’s burgeoning debt problem, and taming the rising yen. Breaking the Futenma-Henoko log jam is not a priority.

But US-Japan relations are a priority, so top Japanese officials will continue to voice support for the Henoko plan, so as to forestall the issue once again provoking anger in Washington and causing instability in the bilateral alliance. All the while they will continue to “explain” to Washington the need for more time to bring along Okinawan public opinion.

It’s a scene that has played out repeatedly over the 18 months, ever since former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was treated as a virtual pariah by the Obama administration and other US officials for having urged that the two countries consider alternatives to the Henoko plan. Painfully aware of the treatment accorded Hatoyama, no DPJ leader (with the possible exception of a weakened Ichiro Ozawa) is willing to risk a direct confrontation with Washington over the Henoko-Futenma issue. By default, if nothing else, the DPJ policy has been to keep the issue on policy life-support at the working level, allowing no light between the official US and Japanese positions, while actually taking no real steps toward implementation.

The Noda cabinet has no one steeped in Okinawa issues, and no one with the heavyweight political gravitas to forge a new understanding between Okinawa and Tokyo.

     MISREADING THE DPJ: Maehara, the DPJ’s policy chief and a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance, is often misunderstood in Washington as someone the US could count on to push hard for the Henoko plan. Little known is that Maehara took the opposite position while Hatoyama was in power. At the time, Maehara, in addition to being transportation minister, was also state minister for Okinawa issues. While then-Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and then-Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada fairly quickly abandoned Hatoyama’s (and the DPJ’s) goal of an alternative to the Henoko plan, Maehara continued to work tirelessly long thereafter in favor of the original DPJ stance. Indeed, Kitazawa and Okada took to freezing Maehara out of their discussions on the Henoko-Futenma issue in the winter and spring of 2010.

Meanwhile, Noda has named Akihisa Nagashima to be his special advisor on foreign and security matters, which will almost surely involve him in Okinawa issues. Nagashima, also a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance and advocate of a bigger regional and global security role for Japan, was initially sympathetic to the DPJ idea that the US and Japan, as allies, could together find an acceptable alternative to the Henoko plan. But during an October 2009 visit to Washington, in his capacity as a senior vice minister of defense, Nagashima was on the receiving end of a stern, sobering lecture by then-US national security advisor General Jim Jones about the vital importance of the planned Henoko facility. Nagashima later relayed the substance of the exchange to some reporters in Washington.

Ironically, Jones has since shifted his stance, and argues that the US operations now run from Futenma could largely be integrated into the huge US Air Force base at Kadena, also on Okinawa. Jones’s revised view parallels that of Senator Webb.

The new foreign minister, Koichiro Gemba, is a rising star within the DPJ, but he is relatively new to foreign affairs, and lacks the political power base in Tokyo both in the Diet and within the bureaucracy that would be required to negotiate a new arrangement with Okinawa.

The new defense minister, Yasuo Ichikawa, is already in hot water politically over his failed effort at self-deprecatory humility; a defense minister should probably not declare himself an amateur on matters of national security. It is unlikely that Ichikawa, should he survive calls for his resignation, will be taking the lead on Okinawa issues.

At the bureaucratic level, the central government is going through some of the motions required for implementation of the Henoko plan. A senior Defense Ministry official recently informed Governor Nakaima of plans to submit by the end of this year an environmental impact statement regarding the Henoko facility. The government would then apply to the governor’s office for permission to begin reclaiming land in Henoko Bay waters. The project requires the Governor’s prior approval.

All of this will enable Noda to give an upbeat report about his efforts when he meets President Obama in New York later this month.

In reality, Governor Nakaima shows no signs of altering his opposition to the Henoko plan, though he remains a staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance. (It will be difficult for anyone to peg him as harboring anti-American sentiments.)

Nakaima will make his views widely known when he visits Washington later this month.

     OPPOSITION ON THE HILL: The situation in Washington concerning Henoko-Futenma, and the overall restructuring of the US Marine presence, is only slightly less-unsettled. Leon Panetta is still putting his team in place. Mark Lippert, a White House favorite, has survived a grueling vetting process and should soon be nominated to be the Pentagon’s new policy chief for East Asia. It remains unclear how Panetta and Lippert will approach the Okinawa issue.

The Marines, meanwhile, are in the midst of an internal study, ordered by then-Defense Secretary Bob Gates, about future roles and missions. The Marine Corps will shrink in size considerably in the coming years, as the US further winds down the taxing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Marines resume their more traditional role as an expeditionary, amphibious force.

With China rising, East Asia’s strategic significance will only continue to grow. But a debt-weary Congress is under great pressure to reduce US defense spending. Finding the proper US strategic posture and force structure in East Asia will be a compelling task for Panetta’s new team.

For all of the pressure on Tokyo to proceed with the Henoko project, the US is woefully far behind on implementation of its side of the realignment of US forces in Japan. Construction delays, cost overruns, and fears of insufficient infrastructure have all raised doubts about the feasibility any time soon of relocating 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members from Okinawa to Guam, as called for in the 2006 “roadmap” agreed to by the two countries.

Three senior US senators – Jim Webb, along with Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Levin and the Committee’s ranking Republican John McCain – have joined forces in opposition to the planned Marine restructuring on Okinawa and Guam. Congress has slowed funding.

Given the troubles on the US side, it is little wonder that a top DPJ official said recently that the Noda government will likely wait for the Obama administration to take the next step.

Some influential American policy makers, including former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, argue that while the Henoko project is dead, it is up to Japan to come forward with an alternative basing arrangement that is both operationally feasible and politically sustainable.

That is unlikely to occur however, as Japanese political leaders do not want to suffer the consequences experienced by Hatoyama. From the Japanese perspective, the ball is really in the American court.

It will take some time before the political leadership in both Washington and Tokyo will see the way to set aside the 2006 roadmap, and jointly devise an alliance force structure and posture in East Asia that fits the region’s vital strategic importance.

 

Noda administration: ‘Mainstream’ holds sway in ‘unified’ DPJ

Prime Minister-designate Yoshihiko Noda hit the ground running, moving quickly to name the four top executives of the ruling Democratic Party (DPJ), while also working to put together a cabinet.

On the surface, the party appointments seem in line with Noda’s commitment to unify a DPJ deeply divided between pro-Ozawa forces, anti-Ozawa ‘mainstream’ forces, and centrists not allied with either of those camps.

A close look, however, shows that while Noda is cleverly involving in his administration some people associated with DPJ strongman Ichiro Ozawa, he otherwise is carefully proceeding on both the policy and political fronts in a direction that might not sit well with the Ozawa camp.

As secretary-general of the DPJ, for example, Noda has tapped Azuma Koshiishi, a long-time Ozawa associate who heads the DPJ caucus in the Upper House. But at 75, it is doubtful Koshiishi will have the energy and power to steer party financial resources or personnel appointments in Ozawa’s direction. The public ‘face’ of the DPJ is more likely to be new Acting DPJ President Shinji Tarutoko, who has deliberately distanced himself from Ozawa for over a year.

Also likely to eclipse Koshiishi will be Seiji Maehara, whom Noda has appointed chief of the DPJ’s Policy Research Committee (PRC). Maehara, who placed a disappointing third in Monday’s race for the DPJ presidency, is one of the pillars of opposition to Ozawa within the DPJ. Noda has promised that as PRC chief, Maehara will have considerable influence over legislation promoted by the government, and also a huge role in DPJ coordination efforts with opposition parties.

Noda says he is committed to a three-party agreement accepted by the DPJ several weeks ago -- over Ozawa’s protests -- to alter aspects of the party’s 2009 manifesto. Maehara supports that stance. And as chief of the DPJ’s Upper House caucus, where efforts to coordinate with the opposition LDP and Komeito will be particularly important, Koshiishi will have a hard time siding with Ozawa against Noda’s instructions to seek better communication with the opposition.

     FORMING A CABINET: Having filled the DPJ’s top executive positions, Noda is now working to form his cabinet. His most critical choice will be for chief cabinet secretary. Does he go ‘big,’ with a political and policy heavyweight like current Secretary General Katsuya Okada? Or does he go ‘small,’ with someone with less gravitas, such as former DPJ Secretary General Tatsuo Kawabata, DPJ Deputy Secretary General Osamu Fujimura, or Koriki Jojima, currently deputy of the DPJ’s PRC. Okada would bring experience to the job and could quickly help stabilize the new administration. But he might overshadow Noda, and raise questions in the public mind about who would actually be running the government. Noda wants and needs Okada, who was critical to Noda’s victory and could wind up instead as finance minister.

On the other hand, none of the ‘small’ candidates would overshadow Noda, and would each bring particular skills. Kawabata served as DPJ secretary general before the party came to power, and informally leads the DPJ Diet members who hail from the old Democratic Socialist Party. He has carefully placed himself within the DPJ between Ozawa and mainstream figures like Okada. Fujimura is a very close Noda associate and played a key role in lining up support for Noda’s election as DPJ president. Jojima played an important role in forging the 3-party agreement to review some DPJ policies, so he is in synch with Noda on that front.

Other key figures to watch:

Michihiko Kano, the current agriculture minister, who lost in the first round of the DPJ presidential race but then steered his supporters to vote for Noda. Kano has been in agreement with Ozawa in opposing a rapid opening of Japan’s agricultural markets through participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP) trade talks. But he was outraged at tactics Ozawa used in the election to try to gather votes for his candidate, Banri Kaieda. Noda will probably reward Kano with continued membership in the Cabinet.

Yukio Edano, currently chief cabinet secretary, won much praise for his calming demeanor during the Fukushima nuclear emergency. But he could wind up sitting on the sidelines for a while, preparing for a future run for prime minister. Edano is very close to the DPJ’s other heavyweight, Acting President Yoshito Sengoku, whose stature has suffered in recent days due to missteps taken in coordinating Seiji Maehara’s campaign to replace the outgoing Naoto Kan.

Akihisa Nagashima, former parliamentary vice minister of defense, is being widely-talked about to run either the foreign or defense ministry.

'Severe confrontation' rocks DPJ

(Editor's note: Due to loss of electrical power stemming from Hurricane Irene, this report must be quite short. We apologize for any inconvenience.)

Voting to replace Naoto Kan as president of the Democratic Party of Japan, and prime minister, will begin in about one hour, in what is shaping up to be the most serious conflict inside the DPJ in recent memory. The top vote getter will likely be Trade Minister Banri Kaieda, but he will fall short of the 50% majority required to claim victory. That will force a runoff between the second-place finisher: either former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara or Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

Stripped to its essentials, the battle pits legendary political heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa against 'mainstream' forces in the DPJ who oppose Ozawa's machine-style approach to electoral politics. It's a battle neither side can afford to lose.

Ozawa's backing will likely enable Kaieda to win the first round, but Kaieda's perceived willingness to do Ozawa's bidding could hurt him severely in the second round. In two debates over the weekend, Kaieda made no effort to disguise his decision to align with Ozawa.

On Sunday night, DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada and former Secretary General Yoshito Sengoku met and agreed that the Noda and Maehara forces should unite in the second round, regardless of which one winds up taking on Kaieda. Okada backs Noda, while Sengoku backs Maehara.

Normally that would likely be sufficient for the 'mainstream' candidate to win. But Ozawa, whose power inside the DPJ has considerably slipped, is pulling out all stops to push Kaieda over the top, and avoid a humiliating personal loss.

Both sides are fighting as if there is no tomorrow -- which there very well might not be for the DPJ in its current form, regardless of who emerges on top in today's voting.

 

 

 

 

PM election: too close to call

The three top contenders to replace the departing Naoto Kan as president of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and prime minister will face off in a nationally televised debate in Tokyo about 3 hours from now, from 2-4 pm local time. The debate could help provide some clarity to a race that is now too close to call, as many of the 398 Diet members who will cast votes on Monday have yet to make a decision, and will be paying close attention. A second debate is scheduled for Sunday.

The top contenders – Trade Minister Banri Kaieda, Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara – will be joined in the debate by Agriculture Minister Michihiko Kano and former Transport Minister Sumio Mabuchi, but the latter two stand little chance of winning.

With backing from legendary party boss Ichiro Ozawa and former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Kaieda seems likely to emerge Monday as the top vote-getter. But he is unlikely to win a 50% majority, triggering a runoff with the contender who finishes second.

Eyes are thus on Maehara and Noda, who will slug it out for the second spot. Once the second runoff spot is determined, will either Noda or Maehara back the other, against Kaieda? There is a great deal of mistrust between the two camps, with Noda harboring misgivings about Maehara’s main backer, DPJ power broker Yoshito Sengoku.

With so much maneuvering taking place among the various DPJ power centers in search of a winning coalition, the possibility remains that last minute deals could alter any expected outcome.

Maehara has two distinct advantages: he is a superior debater, and the latest poll from Asahi, published Saturday morning, showed him favored by 40% of voters, to only 10% for Kaieda. Even though there is not likely to be a Lower House election any time soon, making the “face” of the party less of a pressing a factor in the decision-making of each Diet member, the public’s preference cannot simply be ignored.

Maehara's weakness:  While popular with the public, Maehara is actually a controversial figure inside the DPJ, as he has staked out one of the strongest anti-Ozawa positions within the DPJ. A meeting with Ozawa earlier this week lasted only 10 minutes, and Maehara made pretty clear that he remains opposed to Ozawa regaining the influence he has lost inside the  DPJ.  It would be hard for Maehara to unify the party.

But Kaieda and Noda have weaknesses as well.

Kaieda will be seen as Ozawa's choice, and Ozawa remains one of Japan’s most unpopular political leaders, despite his entrenched (though diminished) position within the DPJ. Moreover, Kaieda  was severely criticized by his own group leader, Hatoyama, for his performance as trade and industry minister during the Fukushima nuclear emergency. Kaieda’s strength to be the national leader also came in for questioning earlier in the year when he broke down in tears during a Diet session involving Fukushima.

Noda’s weakness: He has pushed for a “grand coalition” involving the opposition LDP and Komeito, and he has advocated a quick rise in the national consumption tax. Both positions make many Diet members wary. But many members of the departing Kan’s sizeable DPJ group are leaning toward Noda.

The situation might be clearer after the first debate.

 

 

 

With Cabinet changes, Kan again signals intent to stay

For all the talk about Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s supposedly looming resignation, analysts and politicians alike keep forgetting two things: Kan remains determined to stay in office for at least several more months, and legally Kan’s opponents have no means to dislodge him.

Never was this more clear than on Monday, when Kan made small but highly-significant changes to his Cabinet lineup. Lame duck prime ministers don’t usually undertake Cabinet reshuffles, however slight.

Kan coupled the shakeup with disclosure, for the first time, of clear criteria he will use to time his departure: passage of a second supplemental budget, adoption of legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to finance some 40 percent of the current budget, and adoption of legislation requiring electric power company usage of renewable energy sources.

Kan’s critics, especially leaders of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), argue that nothing can get done in the Diet until Kan leaves office. Kan, by contrast, argues that he will only leave office once the LDP and others cooperate to pass critical legislation relating to post-earthquake/tsunami reconstruction efforts. Kan in many ways has the upper hand, since failure to cooperate will expose the LDP to the wrath of a public that has had its fill of pointless political maneuverings.

     MIKI SIMILARITIES: In some ways Kan’s situation is similar to that faced by Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976, when LDP leaders launched a “Down with Miki” (Miki oroshi) campaign after Miki refused to prevent the arrest of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for his involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal. At the time, Miki rebuffed efforts to oust him, arguing that the LDP could replace him as party president at any time, but not as prime minister until his term expired. Miki was not forced out until a Lower House election in late 1976 resulted in big losses for the LDP. At the time, the four-year term of Lower House members expired, requiring a new election for prime minister. It was only the expiration of his term, not political maneuvering, that dislodged Miki from office.

     KAN’S TERMS: Kan, of course, will not last until the end of his term, which expires in 2013. But a no-confidence motion against him failed earlier this month, after some deft political maneuvering by the prime minister himself. By tradition, only one no-confidence motion can be filed per Diet session, leaving his critics with little legal leverage.

Kan does not want to go down as a failed prime minister. He has personal and good-government motivations. The personal are straight-forward; no one wants to be known as an unsuccessful leader. The good-government factor is less-obvious, but real. Kan believes he is bringing important, substantial changes to Japan, both though his struggle to rearrange the power balance between the bureaucracy and the political world, and through promotion of a two-party system, which implies a viable Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

Kan is determined to not be unceremoniously dumped. His critics have assumed Kan would simply fold under pressure, much as his four predecessors did; all lasted less than one year in office. But that has consistently shown to be wrong. He wants to leave on terms he considers both personally and politically acceptable.

Working in Kan’s favor is the lack of a compelling reason for his ouster. The public is  not enamored of Kan. Polls go back and forth as to how long the public thinks Kan should stay in office. But the public is even more suspicious of the motives of those, especially within the LDP, who want to oust him. The public has also long desired stability in the prime minister’s office – a halt to the revolving door that has plagued the government’s top post for years.

By insisting he remain in office, Kan has actually strengthened the DPJ, quieting at least for now talk of a ‘grand coalition’ with the unpopular LDP. The DPJ, while still unsteady at times, is more stable than many analysts expected would be the case, and the eventual transition to Kan’s successor is likely to be orderly.

     EYE ON ENERGY: At a Monday night press conference following the Cabinet adjustments, Kan did not give a timeframe for expected passage of his three legislative priorities. Most attention is focused on the two budget-related bills. But Kan seems to harbor particular interest in the renewable energy issue.

As a former civic activist, Kan would like to see a weakening of what many see as a nest of unscrupulous political influence bound up in the electric power industry. The LDP has particularly strong ties with the industry, which Kan views as a weakness for the country and a political weapon for the DPJ. Kan has not said what he would do if the LDP were to block his proposed renewable energy legislation, but it is not inconceivable he  would threaten a dissolution of the Diet and a general election. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power catastrophe, accusations of corrupt ties between the LDP and the electric power industry could be a powerful campaign weapon for the DPJ.

Kan is not likely to take that step, as it would risk the DPJ’s substantial Lower House majority and control of central government’s ministries. But the fact that Kan could wield the threat shows the leverage he still has, despite his beleaguered status.

     COURSE OF EVENTS: Top DPJ leaders, who have been meeting without Kan, envision a new Cabinet taking office in late August or early September, arguing that the “torch” of leadership should pass to the next generation of party leaders late in the current 70-day extended Diet session. The executives also say that this new government should formulate the next reconstruction budget.

It remains to be seen if Kan will abide by this schedule. If the recent past is any guide, he won’t.

Meanwhile, Kan is showing up for work every day, utilizing the unusual circumstances in Japan today to stay in power. Kan knows that his critics do not want to be seen as undermining government efforts to address rebuilding in the country’s Tohoku region that was devastated on March 11.

In fact, the government’s headquarters for Tohoku reconstruction, which came into force by legislation passed last week, will begin meetings this week, led by Ryu Matsumoto, whom Kan named to a new ministerial post for reconstruction. Kan will also be aided by rising star Goshi Hosono, who was named to the newly-created state ministerial post for dealing with the Fukushima nuclear crisis.

As long as Kan is promoting reconstruction in the national interest, his critics will have to tread lightly. He may be embattled, but Kan could very well continue to defy expectations of an early departure.

 

 

 

US-Japan base roadmap: ‘dead plan walking’

The lengthy joint security statement set to be issued by the US and Japan today marks the demise of the 2006 bilateral “roadmap” for restructuring US forces in Japan, particularly the plan to construct a facility in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa to replace to US Marine Air Station Futenma.

No one will say this officially, of course. The two governments will continue to say that they have only postponed the 2014 deadline for completion of the new facility, and the related redeployment of 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

But the plan is dead.

Key members of Congress have moved to block it, insisting that more viable, cost-effective, and innovative ways be found to base and deploy US forces in the strategically critical Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, neither the money nor the political will is present to move forward with construction of a new facility that Okinawans – who generally are supportive of the US-Japan alliance – deeply resent. And on Guam, the building of infrastructure and related facilities needed to host a larger number of servicemen and military equipment is far behind schedule and plagued by cost overruns, which has further angered an increasingly debt-weary Congress.

For now, the most likely outcome of the roadmap’s death is a tacit acceptance of the status quo: 17,000 Marines from the division-size III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – the only MEF based abroad – will remain based on Okinawa, and the 1,200-acre Futenma base, which is dangerously located in the center of Ginowan City (pop. 91,000), will remain open.

Few Japanese political leaders are prepared at this point to raise the idea of alternative basing options, for fear of provoking the wrath of a Washington that has been surprisingly inflexible on the issue for over a decade. There is virtually no chance that the initiative to start talks on alternative arrangements will come from Tokyo.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is in the midst of a transition from the historic tenure of retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates – truly a momentous era for the Defense Department – to the incoming team of Leon Panetta, who is moving over from the CIA.

Today’s “2+2” meeting of the defense and foreign ministers of Japan and the US takes place with Gates still in office, making it unrealistic to have expected any change in the official US stance on base realignment in Japan to be apparent in the joint statement. Even if Panetta ultimately chooses to initiate a policy change, it will take time for him to put in place his own team to bring that about, not to mention have the opportunity to give the issue the attention it deserves. Not surprisingly, Panetta is extraordinarily focused Afghanistan and Pakistan, as his trip to Pakistan just 10 days ago for talks with top Army and intelligence officials made clear.

But it is also reasonable to assume that Panetta, as part of his deliberations with Congress about overall defense spending, will want to engage the three influential senators – Carl Levin, Jim Webb, and John McCain – who have taken the lead in insisting on changes in US basing plans for the Asia-Pacific region, including the realignment roadmap for US forces in Japan.

As US forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and cutbacks in defense spending proceed, another US global force posture review is likely, in which context the US and Japan could engage in discussions about alliance roles, missions, and force structure, and update a 2006 realignment roadmap that has already been overtaken by events.

     ALLIANCE POSITIVES: Problems surrounding Okinawa and US basing notwithstanding, today’s bilateral Security Consultative Committee talks (as the ‘2+2’ is formally known) will highlight the enduring, enormous value of the US-Japan alliance – a genuine coming together based on friendship and shared interests that was on display for the world to see in the wake of the ‘triple disaster’ that hit Japan on March 11. The joint statement to be issued today speaks at length about common security challenges in North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran, and other areas, and shared interests in disaster relief, nuclear safety, energy security, climate change, and regional and global economic prosperity.

     UNSTABLE STATUS QUO: Still, the collapse of the 2006 roadmap for base realignment can’t simply be papered over by political leaders and government officials from Washington and Tokyo. Almost 16 years after the horrendous assault and rape of a young Okinawan girl by three US servicemen sparked intense protests and led to base realignment plans, the US and Japan have virtually nothing to show for a decade-and-a-half of intense negotiations. Clearly this is no way to run an alliance, especially one of such immense regional and global importance.

The stalemate reveals deep-seated, uncomfortable realities about the structure and management of the bilateral US-Japan alliance, including discrimination by main-island Japanese (and, implicitly the US) against Okinawa, which bears a hugely-disproportionate share of the burden of US military installations in Japan; a continuing (though much-lessened) tendency of Japanese leaders and citizens alike to bear less-than-full responsibility for security matters; and, a lingering, occasional tendency on the part of American military and civilian leaders to adopt the haughty tone of superiority typical of managers dealing with a client-state.

The original purpose of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), formed by the two countries in November 1995 in the wake of the schoolgirl rape, was to reduce the heavy “footprint” of US military installations on Okinawa. The centerpiece of the SACO agreement, reached in December 1996, was the promised return to Okinawa of the US Marine Air Station Futenma. Virtually everyone agrees Futenma is a disaster just waiting to happen, given its location in a heavily populated area. One helicopter crash in downtown Ginowan City could throw this vital security alliance into crisis.

     INTERIM OPTIONS: Futenma is home to Marine tanker aircraft, and Marine helicopters. Original plans called for moving the tanker aircraft to bases in Kyushu; those plans remain intact. The initial plans envisioned movement of the Marine helicopters to some other existing facility on Okinawa. The first option was the giant US Air Force Kadena base, north of Futenma. But intense rivalries between the US Air Force and the US Marines bureaucratically rendered that “unworkable,” with both services making the dubious argument that it would be dangerous having fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operating in close proximity. A second option was to construct a relatively small heliport inside the Camp Schwab Marine base.

Over time, however, the Kadena and Schwab options gave way to the vision of a brand new runway – either offshore, or with landfill – being built in the Henoko Bay area.

Once the runway vision emerged, the search for a replacement for Futenma was no longer about helicopters; it morphed into the new need for a dedicated Marine runway for fixed-wing aircraft.

And over time, US negotiators began to firmly link the closure of Futenma with the construction of the new runway.

The purpose of this runway? The Marines have never provided a consistent, credible explanation. Ministry of Defense officials in Tokyo who have worked  intensively on the  Futenma replacement issue say they have never been informed about the Marine intentions for the envisioned runway (actually, runways, as plans envision a V-shaped structure). There had been talk by Marine officials of possible use by jet fighters, but Japanese officials counseled against voicing any such intentions for fear of inciting opposition on Okinawa. Since then, US officials have spoken about Gulfstream-style executive jets. Some officials have also mentioned the need for runways in the event that  MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft need to conduct emergency landings in fixed-wing (instead of helicopter) mode. The Marines are scheduled to deploy 24 Osprey to Okinawa starting in October 2012, which has infuriated many on Okinawa, including moderate Governor Hirokazu Nakaima.

Once the need for a runway is either eliminated or put aside, the Futenma air station closure could proceed even if the overall base realignment plan is postponed. The Marine tankers at Futenma could move to  Kyushu, as planned, and the helicopters (even MV-22 Osprey) could be moved to either Kadena (as envisioned by Senators Levin and Webb), or to a heliport inside of Camp Schwab, which engineers say could be constructed quickly.

Closing Futenma, as both the US and Japanese governments have promised would be done, would go a long way toward easing tensions on Okinawa about the heavy presence of US bases. It would also deeply impress Okinawans if the US were to finally deliver on promises to reduce the noise associated with continuous flights in and out of the huge Kadena air base. Up to now, the US has agreed to modify some flight schedules, only to rotate in other aircraft, with the result of no net noise decrease.

On the other hand, tensions will linger as long as Futenma remains open, especially because the US unilaterally decided to link the Futenma closure to the broader realignment, which the SACO agreement of 15 years ago never envisioned. If Futenma remains open, the 24 Osprey set for deployment to Okinawa next year will likely wind up there.

Okinawans are also worried about political retaliation from Tokyo, in the form of reduced economic aid. An existing large development assistance program is scheduled to expire next year, and renewal talks have barely begun.

     FROM INTERIM TO LONG-TERM BASING: There would be relatively few political or technical obstacles to closing the Futenma air station as an interim measure, while postponing the final decisions about overall US basing in Japan and the region until a later date. To the contrary, closing Futenma, and integrating its current assets and operations into existing facilities, would create the kind of political goodwill that would facilitate broader US-Japan strategic dialogue.

Alas, both interim and long-term solutions to the Futenma problem will have to wait until Leon Panetta and his team are up and running inside the Pentagon. And even then it will likely take time for the issue to make it to Panetta’s desk.

Until then, the unstable status quo – Futenma’s continued operation – will likely remain, causing the US-Japan alliance to work with less-than-optimal efficiency and friendly willingness.

 

 

 

Kan again confounds opponents, analysts

Once again, Naoto Kan’s political opponents, and a broad spectrum of political analysts in Japan, have underestimated the Japanese prime minister’s determination to stay in power.

With a deft, last minute political maneuver – an announced willingness to step aside at some unspecified date – Kan managed to divide opponents within his own Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and easily beat back on Thursday a no-confidence motion submitted by a deeply-frustrated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

The big losers: The LDP, which submitted the motion despite the likelihood of defeat, and DPJ leader-turned-dissident Ichiro Ozawa, who once again finds himself in Japan’s political wilderness, but this time while under indictment for alleged misuse of political funds, and weighed down by an extraordinarily low level of popularity among voters.

Kan is by no means strong, of course, and even the medium-term outlook for his DPJ is very uncertain.

Speculation will grow as to who will replace Kan, what will become of the struggling LDP, who will follow Ozawa in the likely creation of a new political party, and whether some kind of coalition government will form to stabilize the government.

It will take time for some clarity to emerge.

But with this latest episode of political soap opera out of the way, Kan will likely be able in the short-term to shame his opponents into at least pretending to focus on the pressing national needs of post-earthquake reconstruction and longer-term economic reforms.

Working in his favor is the widespread revulsion among voters that narrow political maneuvering took precedence over actual governing in the midst of a serious national crisis. Kan is not a particularly sympathetic figure; his approval rating is below 30 percent. But close to 50 percent of voters in recent polls said he should be allowed to remain in office until reconstruction efforts have had time to set in.

Ozawa and the LDP just ignored those voter sentiments, and will likely suffer as a result.

Actually, even before the March 11 earthquake, Kan was using the public’s desire for political stability as his main political card to justify remaining in office. Opponents and analysts alike predicted a March or April “crisis” for Kan, but he seemed to revel in ignoring them.

Kan now seems likely to push for an extension of the current Diet session, now scheduled to end June 22, so as to pass a second supplementary budget for reconstruction. After that, a special Diet session seems likely for late August or early September, for adoption of legislation to allow issuance of bonds to finance a big portion of the national budget that started April 1.

It’s anyone’s guess how long Kan will stay in office. He did not specify any date to leave. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who withdrew his support for the no-confidence motion after Kan offered to step aside, indicated his view that Kan’s departure should come early this summer. But Kan has consistently shown an unusual determination to resist pressure he regards as unreasonable or overly-political, and it is by no means certain that with the no-confidence vote out of the way, Hatoyama or other remaining dissidents will have the power to oust Kan as early as they may now desire. That could cause further party turmoil, though the desire for another bruising political battle any time soon is very limited, which will work to Kan’s benefit.

Kan will want to be able to say that the reconstruction efforts are genuinely on solid footing. Sometime next Autumn would seem to make sense. In any case, Hatoyama’s early-departure musings notwithstanding, Kan has likely achieved his main goal: to not be unceremoniously forced from office, and to have his departure take place in a relatively orderly fashion via internal DPJ deliberations.

Kan may also have prevented a breakup of the DPJ. The party remains an unruly group, with competing centers of power. But the desire to remain in control of the government could be enough to keep the disparate elements together, at least for a while longer.

It remains very unclear what remains of the on-again, off-again political relationship between Hatoyama and Ozawa.

Kan will have considerably more room to try to govern, something he is actually interested in, despite the somewhat unfair accusations that he has mismanaged events since March 11. With Ozawa and his supporters likely to depart, remaining dissidents somewhat disarmed, and younger aspirants to party leadership mollified by the prospect of his near-term departure, Kan will try to reassert the reform program he dubs the “Third Opening” of Japan.

It also seems likely Kan will be in office for a long-delayed summit meeting with President Obama, now tentatively set for sometime in September, though postponement once again until Kan’s successor is in place is a possibility. The two governments may have more to say about that when their respective defense and foreign ministers meet in a “2+2” meeting later this month.

Pressure builds for US shift on Okinawa

Pressure is growing on the Obama Administration to significantly alter plans for US Marine basing arrangements on Okinawa, but chances seem slim for a policy shift at least until Defense Secretary Robert Gates departs office late next month.

Several factors have converged to give the issue new urgency. Opposition remains strong on Okinawa to construction of a new facility in the Henoko Bay area, to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been slated for closure since 1995. There is simply no momentum in Japan to move forward with the project, a situation made more stark by the Great Eastern Earthquake of March 11. Tokyo is intensely focused on reconstruction efforts; neither the financial nor political capital is available to push the Henoko project through.

Meanwhile, construction delays and cost overruns continue to bedevil a critical, related portion of the plan: the relocation of over 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members from Okinawa to Guam.

And in Washington, an increasingly debt-weary Congress is asking whether it is worth the cost of building the new Henoko facility and the new Marine housing and related facilities on Guam, when cheaper force configurations more conducive to strategic needs in Asia might be found.

Diplomats are under stress to find some answers because of plans for a “2+2” meeting of defense and foreign ministers from the two countries, to be followed by a summit meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Naoto Kan. With leaders in Japan tied down with reconstruction efforts, no schedule has yet been set for either meeting, though staging both by the end of June has been discussed.

When those meetings do occur, it won’t be possible to simply ignore Futenma and related Okinawa issues. It is very possible Washington and Tokyo will agree to state the obvious: the 2014 deadline to complete the Okinawa and Guam force structure realignment will have to be pushed back. It is also possible the administration will accept a very low-key statement of continued support for the Henoko plan, rather than a high-profile emphasis, so as to avoid the issue returning as a major irritant at the top of the bilateral agenda.

There remain pockets of hope within the Obama administration that White House will force the Pentagon to accept a review of the whole base realignment plan for Okinawa prior to the Obama-Kan summit, but that seems very unlikely.

     PENTAGON BOTTLENECK: Secretary Gates remains adamantly opposed, and there does not yet exist within the administration the necessary correlation of political forces willing to force Gates to accept a new approach. The Pentagon’s rigid stance is worsened by the lack of a replacement yet for General Chip Gregson, who retired recently as assistant secretary of defense for Asian affairs.

Senior Pentagon officials continue to say the administration is committed to the Henoko plan. But with the Pentagon leadership in transition, with CIA director Leon Panetta set to take over once Gates departs, the senior officials are exceedingly reluctant to veer from established policy, even if they want to. Officials at this level are in a bind: aware of the opposition in Japan, aware of the enormous investment the US Marines, and US diplomacy, have in the existing policy, but not politically strong enough to even push for, much less win, a policy change.

     AWAITING LIPPERT: The White House has tapped Obama confidante Mark Lippert to replace Gregson, but Lippert has been bruised a bit as he works his way through the administration’s internal political gauntlet. Some Pentagon officials have quietly raised concerns that Lippert might have the kind of strained relations with senior military officers that could hinder his effectiveness.

Lippert, who has served in Iraq as a Navy intelligence officer, is “pro-military,” and is known to have functioned as a bit of a window into the US armed forces for then-Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama. But Lippert is not “pro-Pentagon.” Lippert is an international relations major from Stanford University who has served in the military with pride, but is committed to the military as a tool of policy, not out of institutional loyalty. His loyalty is to Obama.

For much of Obama’s first year in office, Lippert served as chief of staff for the National Security Council (NSC). He clashed with General Douglas Lute, a holdover from the Bush administration as “war czar” for Iraq and Afghanistan. He also had tense relations with his nominal boss, then-National Security Advisor General Jim Jones. Critics say Lippert flaunted his close relationship with Obama. But the close tie with Obama is real, and strong, and Obama personally would like to see Lippert overseeing Asia policy for the Pentagon. That is still likely to happen, though those harboring reservations could trip him up.

     ASIA POLICY SHIFT: Evidence continues to grow that President Obama and his top aides would like to see a major US strategic shift toward greater emphasis on Asia, which should be particularly evident when the President hosts the APEC summit in Hawaii next November.

It’s notable that in a recent New Yorker analysis of Obama’s foreign policy, NSC director Tom Donilon, deputy director Ben Rhodes (Obama’s long-time chief foreign policy speechwriter), and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell were all quoted outlining just such a strategic “rebalancing” of American foreign policy. The Pentagon’s top policy chief, Michelle Flournoy, outlined a similar policy in a recent talk at Johns Hopkins.

The administration is looking to energize America’s role in East Asia by fomenting a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. The economic component, for now, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

Japan is already cultivating security ties with India and Vietnam, and deepening ties with South Korea, including discussion of formal military agreements involving information sharing and the exchange of military goods and services. China and South Korea both provided relief assistance to Japan after March 11, opening the door to expansion of the existing “Plus Three” dialogue between Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing.

Washington is supportive of these steps by Japan, as they indirectly extend the influence of the US-Japan alliance, while providing Tokyo a far greater degree of self-determination than possible through the exclusively bilateral US-Japan security alliance.

     THE FUTENMA DILEMMA: The problem Washington faces is that continued focus on the Futenma dispute threatens to distract the US and Japan from this broader strategic goal, allowing a relatively minor base dispute to disrupt the whole alliance. Excess focus on Futenma also detracts from the absolutely critical role played by the naval facility at Yokosuka, where the US home ports the USS George Washington carrier group, and the role of the huge Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa. Together, Kadena and Yokosuka allow the US to project enormous power throughout East Asia, and are the principle means to deter North Korean aggression, and to balance China’s rising military role in the region.

Tokyo continues to insist Japan fully backs the plan for a new facility at Henoko, fearful that admitting the plan is dead will cause tension with Washington. And Washington continues to back the Henoko plan, because no political decision has been made to abandon the bureaucratic status quo.

With no decision yet made to abandon the Henoko project, none of the necessary talks about a new plan can proceed. That leaves the US-Japan alliance dangerously vulnerable to a crisis in the event of a helicopter crash at the Futenma facility, which is surrounded by civilian communities.

     CONGRESSIONAL INTRIGUE: Into this bureaucratic quagmire have stepped three senior and very influential US senators: Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCain, the Ranking Republican on Armed Services; and, Jim Webb, chairman of the Asia subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations. On May 13, the three senators issued a joint statement calling for the Defense Department to “re-examine plans to restructure U.S. military forces in East Asia.” The senators said the US “strongly supports a continuous and vigorous US presence in the region,” but emphasized that they “believe the current DoD realignment plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.”

While the statement was “joint,” Senator Levin seemed to emphasize the need for restraint, and cost-effectiveness, in defense spending, especially in the construction of new overseas facilities. Senator McCain tended to emphasize strategy, saying: “The Asia-Pacific region’s growing role in the global distribution of power requires us to consistently view and update plans for the U.S. military’s role in the region.” And Webb forcefully challenged the Marine Corps claims that construction of a new facility in Henoko Bay to replace the Futenma air station is indispensable to the Marine presence in, and thus the stability of, East Asia.

Webb brings to the issue years of experience as a Naval Academy graduate, a highly-decorated Marine officer, a military planner, a former Secretary of the Navy, and now almost a full term as a US senator.

With Webb taking the lead, the three senators proposed a dramatic overhaul of the US Marine presence in East Asia. The key elements would include: a) “abandonment” of the Henoko project at Camp Schwab as a replacement for the Futenma facility; b) integration of the Marine Corps assets at Futenma into Kadena Air Force base, while dispersing some Air Force assets now at Kadena to other areas of the Pacific; c)  home-basing in Hawaii or at Camp Pendleton the 8,000 Marines now scheduled to redeploy to Guam, and deploy those Marines on a rotating basis throughout the Pacific.

     THE JONES ROLE:  Most intriguing is that retired Marine Corps General Jim Jones, who was President Obama’s national security advisor until last October, played an important role in helping Webb craft these proposals. It will be difficult for the current Marine Corps leadership to argue to legendary Marine veterans Jones and Webb that their proposals would be harmful to the Marine Corps, and are otherwise operationally unrealistic.

Jones first publicly revealed his apparently evolving views on Okinawa in a meeting last week with a group of Japanese parliamentarians, including former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki (LDP) and Mikio Shimoji, policy research chief for the People’s New Party (PNP). According to Shiozaki and Shimoji, who met with reporters after their meeting with Jones and displayed their written notes, Jones said that he had always thought the best approach on Okinawa was to merge into the Kadena air base the Marine aircraft operations now based at Futenma. The Henoko project was not needed.

It remains unclear what, if anything, Jones did to try to change American policy toward Futenma while he was national security advisor.

     THE SKEPTICAL VIEW: Some sources very close to the situation are skeptical that the Obama administration will shift Okinawa policy any time soon. According to this view, it makes sense that the administration would seek to kick the Futenma-Henoko issue down the road a while longer. Pushing back the 2014 deadline would amount to acknowledging the obvious, and acknowledging the difficulties to proceed so soon after the March 11 natural disasters would also buy more time to find a permanent solution.

But Senator Webb is proposing a wholesale rethinking of American strategy and force structure in the Western Pacific, and only the Secretary of Defense and/or the President himself can make those kinds of decisions. Without that heavy push from the White House, according to this view, it would not be possible to shake the bureaucracy out of its policy rut.

From a strategy standpoint, opponents of a shift in Okinawa policy will argue that it would signal a US retreat from Asia, and reduce the American deterrence of China.

     WORKING WITH CONGRESS: But the White House continues to send signals that it is serious about a shift in strategy toward Asia. A restructured US force posture would not be seen as retreat, but rather an effective region-wide “hedge” in the event China tries to throw its growing weight around in the region. And sources close to Kurt Campbell say that he is convinced that continued US and Japanese wrangling over Futenma will threaten the whole “shift” strategy, because it can’t work without a vibrant US-Japan alliance.

Campbell is prepared to work with Webb and others in Congress on a new basing arrangement for the Marines in the Pacific. Once Panetta takes over as defense secretary, and assuming Lippert becomes his top deputy for Asia, the White House would have in place an administration-wide team to pursue an expanded role in the region.

White House to tap Obama friend as Pentagon’s Asia chief

The White House will soon nominate Mark Lippert, a close friend and trusted advisor to President Barack Obama, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, according to sources close to the situation. Lippert will replace General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, who will depart April 1. Barring any unexpected glitches in the laborious background check that is now standard for high-level appointments, the Lippert nomination should be made public shortly. With his Capitol Hill experience as an aide to Senator Patrick Leahy and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, and his presidential ties, Lippert should have little trouble winning Senate confirmation.

The tapping of Lippert, who was then-Senator Barack Obama’s first foreign policy advisor starting in 2005 and became an overall friend and confidante, comes at a critical time in Obama’s effort to craft his own doctrine for America’s role in the world. It’s a clear sign of the importance the president places on US ties with East Asia.

    STRATEGIC REBALANCING: Even before taking office, Obama was influenced by a gnawing sense in much of the US foreign policy community that the US global posture was dangerously out of balance: a debilitating commitment of national power and prestige to two questionable land wars in Southwest Asia, alongside a mysterious lack of strategic investment of time, energy, and resources to an Asia-Pacific region that is anxiously witnessing the truly historic economic and military rise of China.

The first order of business was to extricate the huge US national security apparatus (planning, intelligence, troops, equipment, money, diplomacy) from Iraq and Afghanistan, which the Administration has been doggedly trying to do, but in both cases is proving easier said than done. (The White House really did not want to lose focus by getting sucked into Libya…)

Simultaneously, the Administration has been trying to reassert, and reconfigure, America’s role in East Asia. Some initial fanciful notions of a ‘strategic partnership’ with China have given way to the reality that Beijing is still somewhat clumsily seeking to define its role as an emerging regional and global power. Tensions have run high with China since the leadership in Beijing has resisted reining in its errant North Korean ally, and has haughtily asserted claims on territories controlled by Japan and some Southeast Asian nations.

Instead, the Administration is trying to foment a system of open and transparent economic and security cooperation in the region, defining the terms of engagement to which China has to respond. The economic component is the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade initiative. And the security component involves building on America’s traditional bilateral security alliances in the region to include a network of overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships from India, through Vietnam and Indonesia, to Australia, and up to Korea and Japan.

    THE LIPPERT ROLE: One way or another, the President wanted Mark Lippert to play a role in this emerging strategic plan to rebalance America’s global position. Several months ago the White House was looking at Lippert to go to the Pentagon as a deputy assistant secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict (SOLIC). These are the counter-terrorism operations that will become increasingly important as the US steadily withdraws ground forces from Afghanistan.

But the White House eventually settled on Lippert for the more senior post of assistant secretary for East Asia, which will require both a bold strategic vision and a deft ability to challenge some entrenched elements of the US military-security bureaucracy.

Lippert has no background in Asia. But there is no question that he will be speaking for the President.

A graduate of Stanford, with a degree in International Relations, Lippert quickly found work on the Hill with Senator Leahy, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. He joined up with Obama in 2005.

Along the way, Lippert decided to pursue his lifelong interest in the military, and utilized a little-known but important Navy program that allows skilled foreign policy specialists to commission as Naval officers and work part time in Naval Intelligence or as a staff aide to senior officers. (Interestingly, Lippert’s soon-to-be counterpart at the State Department, Assistant Secretary for East Asia Kurt Campbell, served as an aide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the same program.)

Before the Obama presidential campaign entered full swing, Lippert served a tour in Iraq as an intelligence officer assigned to a Navy SEAL special operations unit. Upon his return, he resumed his position right next to Obama, alongside Obama’s other foreign policy alter ego, Denis McDonough, now the President’s Deputy National Security advisor. Even as the Obama campaign’s team of foreign policy advisors grew to over 300, including some establishment heavyweights, it was Lippert and McDonough who were rarely out of eye contact with Obama.

After the election, Lippert served as chief of staff for the NSC, nominally led by retired Marine General Jim Jones. The relationship was uneasy however because Lippert had much closer ties to the President. Lippert eventually left the NSC to serve another Navy tour, and returned to Washington a few months ago to once again work for Obama. General Jones has left the NSC, replaced by Tom Donilon, who shares the “rebalance toward Asia” perspective.

    THE POLICY VISION: Once he takes office, Lippert won’t have to define policy as much as implement policy. With the strong backing of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Administration’s emerging policy toward Asia has mostly been shaped by Kurt Campbell. The policy starts with the principle that the US-Japan alliance is the foundation of the US strategic position in the region. The US Kadena air force base on Okinawa, and the US naval base at Yokosuka are the keys to the ability of the US to project power and maintain stability. And, partly in response to the rise of China, Japan and other nations in the region are becoming increasingly comfortable with military-to-military cooperation. The beginnings of a broad security architecture are taking shape, not to contain China, but as a framework for the peaceful integration of China, and as a hedge in the event Beijing settles, even temporarily, on a more troubling posture in the region.

    THE FUTENMA PROBLEM: Lippert’s most difficult, and important, task may turn out to be resolving the vexing problem of the US Marine Corps presence on Okinawa. Technically, the US and Japan have an agreement for roughly half of the 17,000 Marines now stationed on Okinawa with the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to relocate to Guam by 2014. As part of the deal, the US Marine Station Futenma, on Okinawa, would close, and its key operations (mostly involving helicopters) would relocate to a new facility to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa, close the Marine Camp Schwab. The key component would be a new runway built to accommodate the controversial V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotator vehicle that can land and takeoff either as a chopper or fix-wing aircraft.

Public opinion on Okinawa is firmly against the new facility. Tokyo signed the deal with Washington, but has been unable for 15 years to bring Okinawans on board. Washington insists the deal should proceed, and expects Tokyo to deliver its side of the bargain.

The issue is deadlocked. The Henoko project is essentially dead, though no official death notice has been issued.

Instead, the issue has continued to be a dangerous irritant that can easily be inflamed (as occurred recently when word emerged that then-State Department Japan desk chief Kevin Maher had made inappropriate comments about Okinawans; an otherwise unimportant incident took on outsized importance because of the backdrop of tension over Futenma.)

For a while, the Futenma issue threatened to disrupt the whole US-Japan alliance, overshadowing the critical roles of Kadena and Yokosuka, and the growing willingness of Japan to take on more regional and even global security responsibilities.

    WISHING IT AWAY: Today, Washington and Tokyo have seen the wisdom of temporarily posting a resolution, confining Futenma discussions to working level meetings. The issue is in a state of unsteady equilibrium. Tokyo continues to voice unequivocal support for the project, so as to not rile American opinion in a way that would bring the issue back to the top of the bilateral agenda. In reality, virtually no political leader in Tokyo wants to touch the issue. In the wake of the recent tragic earthquake, that will be the case even more. And Washington continues to insist the plan must go forward, but does so in a more low-key style so as to not have it return to the top of the agenda.

This approach has two problems: Futenma remains open, and just one US aircraft accident among the heavily concentrated population surrounding the base could provoke such a backlash as to threaten all US bases in Japan, including the vital Kadena and Yokosuka installations. And as long as the two sides pretend the existing Henoko plan can still move ahead, there is no possibility to discuss alternative basing arrangements.

The Marines want to stay on Okinawa. It is convenient. Japan picks up much of the bill. And it is not clear where the money would come from to fund a transfer and permanent basing somewhere else, such as Guam or Hawaii.

With the White House focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, including continued heavy deployments by US Marines in Afghanistan, the President’s advisors have fiercely resisted having the Futenma issue reach his desk. The White House does not want to have any tension with the Marines over Okinawa, and does not want to have to go to Congress for the funds to finance an alternative basing plan.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has shared that reluctance. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, careful to maintain her successful alliance with Gates on broader issues, has gone along.

But the stalemate can’t last forever, especially because it will continue to prove disruptive to the broader strategic vision of rebalancing the US global posture toward Asia, in cooperation with Japan.

    NEW MARINE BASING ARRANGEMENT: The best solution would be for the US to scrap the 2006 “roadmap” with Japan that seemed to finalize the Marine realignment on Okinawa and Guam.

There is no compelling strategic reason for the Marines to be on Okinawa. They are a global force that can be based anywhere. They certainly are not critical to the US deterrent capability in Asia. During the tense moments with China last summer, it was the USS George Washington aircraft carrier out of Yokosuka, together with fleet air units and larger air capabilities out of Kadena that provided the US show of force in the region.

It makes no sense for the heavy Marine presence on Okinawa to cause the kinds of irritants that could ultimately threaten the vital continued US presence at Kadena and Yokosuka.

A workable solution could involve a phasing out of the III MEF from Okinawa, to be replaced by Japanese Marine units, trained by the United States, who would be responsible for the defense of Japan’s southern islands. To dispel any notions of a slip in US commitment to Japan or the region, the US could permanently base an Ohio-class submarine out of Yokosuka, and permanently base a unit of F-22 aircraft at Misawa or some other facility in Japan.

The Marines could be permanently based elsewhere, with preparations in place for the use of Japanese facilities in the event of a crisis, and visiting basing rights to be negotiated throughout the region.

A solution to the Okinawa problem becomes feasible in the context of the broader repositioning of the United States strategically in the region.

Lippert has just the kind of political clout that would be required to bring the Marines along. Nothing short of intervention by a strong defense secretary, or a person with clear White House backing, can break the current deadlock over Futenma.

Will Lippert adopt that role? If he does, he and Campbell could make a formidable team capable of reshaping the US presence in East Asia for years to come.

The danger is that he will choose to stick with the existing framework, hoping to avoid confronting the bureaucratic inertia in the military and on Capitol Hill. That would amount to presidential endorsement of the existing deadlocked plan, which would greatly inhibit the US-Japan alliance from evolving into a much more vibrant force for stability in the region anytime soon.

 

 

 

 

Japan’s nuclear crisis: An end in sight?

The world might soon be able to breathe a giant sigh of relief.

At Japan’s crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility, modest success in delivering desperately-needed water by helicopters and water-cannon trucks, and the impending restoration of limited electrical power to at least two of the facility’s six units, could be the framework for resolving the greatest industrial catastrophe involving nuclear technology since the Chernobyl explosion in 1986.

Water is critical to cooling the nuclear reactors and spent fuel storage ponds at the Fukushima facility, which otherwise could overheat and lead to troubling amounts of radioactive emissions.

Four of the six units require emergency attention, with units 3 and 4 particularly critical.

The use of helicopters and water trucks is a stop gap measure until restored electrical power can activate water pumping systems that normally do the job. That may not be as simple as it sounds. Wiring inside the units may be burned and need replacing. The water pumps themselves may be damaged. And with radiation levels within the plant boundary quite high, workers are hampered in performing their jobs.

But even if restoration of electrical power and water pumping is delayed, many nuclear engineers argue that, however cumbersome, the delivery of water by helicopter and truck should stabilize the reactors and cooling ponds sufficiently to stave off worrisome increases in radiation levels in Japan. Thus far, radiology specialists widely agree, the increased radiation levels experienced since the problems developed last week at Fukushima Daiichi pose no health risk to the general population in Japan. “The total exposure of the Japanese public to increased radiation has been insignificant,” says Professor Kim Kearfott, a nuclear engineering and radiology specialist at the University of Michigan.

Indeed, these same experts say, even a much-feared (and exceedingly unlikely) nuclear fuel “meltdown” would produce nothing even close to a health crisis in Japan.

That is not a license for complacency of course. While not a health catastrophe, the breakdown at Fukushima Daiichi is an industrial catastrophe of enormous proportions and global implications, necessitating as quick a resolution as possible.

In that context, reports of rifts between US and Japanese officials over information sharing and threat assessments seem highly-exaggerated. The ‘fog of war’ under such stressful and complex conditions understandably causes tension and disagreements, but that is a far cry from a dysfunctional breach of baseline trust.

     AT THE PLANT: Helicopters and water trucks have concentrated on Unit 3 in recent days, and to a lesser extent Unit 4. Unit 3 has both a reactor vessel loaded with fuel rods that need cooling, and a storage pond with spent fuel rods that also need cooling. Government officials believe efforts to add water to the storage pond at Unit 3 were successful in the last day. The reputable World Nuclear News reported March 17 that Self Defense Force fire engines delivered 30 tons of water towards or into the spent fuel storage pond. The National Police Agency had plans to use a riot police force high-pressure water cannon truck to try to cool down the storage ponds at Unit 4. The truck can deliver water at high speeds from up to 100 meters. There is evidence the watering efforts have reduced radiation levels.

Meanwhile, Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), owner of the distressed facility, launched power restoration efforts on March 17, involving some 320 workers. The company planned to run a cable from a high-voltage line owned by Tohoku Electric, connecting first to Unit 2, and later to Unit 1. Others will follow. The new cable will run a half-mile from a main high-voltage power grid. Electrical machinery giants Toshiba and Hitachi have dispatched teams of engineers to assist.

The reactor vessels and storage ponds pose different challenges, with the latter the more immediate.

The fuel rods in Units 1, 2, and 3 have almost surely suffered damage as a result of being left partially uncovered within reactor vessels. Rather than melting, Dr. John Lee, author of the forthcoming “Risk and Safety Analysis of Nuclear Systems,” says it is more likely the fuel rods partially liquefied, with zirconium from the fuel rods interacting with water to produce hydrogen. That’s what produced explosions at several units earlier this week.

Nevertheless, the reactor vessels have remained intact, limiting the release of radioactive particles. Even in the highly-improbable event that fuel rods melted, penetrated the steel of the reactor vessel, and then penetrated the thick concrete pad of the primary containment shell, the molten fuel would settle in the soil, releasing only limited amounts of radioactive particles. That’s not a pretty scenario, but it’s far from a disaster.

Some news accounts have claimed that Unit 3 is particularly dangerous because the fuel used is a uranium-plutonium mixture, and plutonium is extraordinarily toxic. But the fuel mixture in question actually uses plutonium dioxide, which is not readily absorbed by the body.

The cooling ponds for spent fuel pose a more serious problem. Lack of water removes a shield against radiation. It also allows for a heating up of the fuel rods, production of hydrogen, and the danger of an explosion that could more readily disperse radioactive particles than did the explosions caused by hydrogen from the reactors. For this reason, Japanese officials have placed priority on getting water to the storage ponds.

     RADIATION EXPOSURE: In no case, says Dr. Lee, is it possible to have a Chernobyl-style explosion. Instead, he recommends that the Three Mile Island case of 1979 be seen as a reference point for the unfolding events in Japan. Fukushima is already worse than TMI by simple virtue of the fact that there are several troubled units, whereas as TMI had only one reactor.  The comparison is still useful.

“In the areas surrounding Three Mile Island,” Lee says, “the worst radiation exposure among the general public was the equivalent of two chest x-rays. In the Fukushima case, the worst would be somewhat higher, but well below levels we should worry about.

“Within the current evacuation zone of up to 19 miles or so, the very worst case scenario would be an increased exposure equal to 1 CT scan, which is equivalent to 100 chest x-rays.”

Lee insists: “There cannot be a massive release of radioactivity, especially if there is some amount of water maintained in the reactor vessel, and the storage pools. And I don’t see why that is not possible at this point.”

     CONCERN FOR ON-SITE WORKERS: For workers engaged in emergency operations at the Fukushima facility, the Japanese government is adhering to strict safety standards roughly in line with those followed in the US. Under normal circumstances, Japan’s occupational guidelines for nuclear-related jobs is actually tougher than that of the US, with each worker limited to exposure to 2 Rem (a unit of measurement for uranium dosage) per year, compared with 5 Rem in the US. Under emergency circumstances, the US raises the limit to 25 Rem, while Japan goes up to only 10 Rem. However, during the Fukushima crisis, Japanese authorities raised the limit inside Japan to 25 Rem.

To put that in some perspective, it takes about 100 Rem to induce symptoms of radiation sickness. About 500 Rem is a lethal dose.

     A US-JAPAN SPLIT: Meanwhile, frustrations in Washington and throughout Japan notwithstanding, there is little evidence to support accusations that the Japanese government is somehow withholding information, anymore than there was evidence last year that the Obama administration withheld information about the BP oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. The earthquake and tsunami, followed by the nuclear power crisis, add up to the biggest crisis in post-war Japan. The response of the Japanese government, while perhaps not a model of management efficiency and  communication skill, hardly matches the cartoonish combination of obfuscation and incompetence often portrayed in parts of the US and Japanese media. How would any US government have dealt simultaneously with Three Mile Island, the BP oil leak, and Hurricane Katrina, which is about what the triple whammy of the earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear crisis amount to in Japan?

As evidence of a US split with Tokyo, some analysts have cited the Congressional testimony on Wednesday by Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman Gregory Jaczko, in which he seemed to question the validity of some Japanese government assessments of the unfolding nuclear problem in Japan.

In particular, Jaczko said the US had concluded that the spent fuel storage pool in Unit 4 was empty of water, with the implication that the Unit’s dysfunction posed a bigger radiation threat than Japanese officials had yet to acknowledge.

Based on that assessment, the NRC recommended that US citizens in Japan living in the vicinity of the Fukushima plant evacuate to a distance of 50 miles – far further than the 20 miles the Kan government in Tokyo recommended for Japanese citizens.

Japanese officials, backed by French counterparts, insisted there was at least some water in Unit 4’s storage pond, and the NRC later backed off by saying “the evidence is so far inconclusive.”

The NRC evacuation radius recommendation was based on guidelines in place for US emergencies: to move people to an area where they would be subject to radiation levels no higher than one Rem. Subsequent tests conducted by US officials with American instrumentation found that to achieve the goal of one Rem exposure limitation, the 12-19 mile evacuation zone established by the Japanese government was sufficient. (No evidence of faulty information from Tokyo in that regard…)

In hindsight, it seems fair to say that Jaczko’s Congressional testimony, and subsequent evacuation zone recommendation for US nationals in Japan, stemmed in large part from a desire to maintain his own, and the NRC’s, credibility with a Congress and US public that are already beginning to ask questions about the safety of US nuclear power facilities.

A better sense of US thinking about cooperation with Japan came on Thursday, when Jaczko joined Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman at the White House for a press briefing on the nuclear crisis in Japan and its implications for the US. Both Jaczko and Poneman repeatedly referred to the complexity of the situation in Japan, and showed what seemed to be genuine sympathy for the extraordinary management difficulties involved.