Dispatch Japan

The US, Japan, and Okinawa

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a fine speech at the US Naval Academy yesterday, outlining the new US approach to East Asia.

But she barely mentioned Japan, the allied nation where the US has its only forward-deployed aircraft carrier group (Yokosuka), and its only forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Force (Okinawa), not to mention the biggest air force base in the Western Pacific (Kadena).

All in Japan.

The US forward-deployed presence in Japan is courtesy of an independent Japan. And it’s good for Japan’s own security; that’s why it works, and why Americans should never take the alliance for granted; nor should Japanese officials.

American and Japanese officials have mismanaged this crucial relationship over the past few years. Both sides share irresponsibility. The Democratic Party of Japan was not really prepared to take charge in 2009. The US, at best, was not prepared to see the DPJ succeed; many in Washington wanted the DPJ to fail.

Unfortunately, the US continues to embrace dismissive attitudes toward Japan that are not far removed from the Occupation era.

Behind the scene, many US strategists argue that the US should cultivate the alliance; Japanese thoughts and opinions cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, somewhat-frustrated US officials say Japan would be best to not ignore regional and global responsibilities.

     REBALANCE: The core of the new US approach to Asia started in July, 2010, with Hillary Clinton’s speech in Hanoi, warning China to not use force to resolve territorial disputes.

Then came the Sankaku dispute between Japan and China, in September 2010. The US, largely led by Kurt Campbell, did not flinch: immediate support for Japan.

But Campbell is restricted, lacking the power to break through the bureaucratic nightmare created by US military interservice rivalies. The problem is compounded by budget restraints; construction on Guam is far off-schedule.

Until to 2010 Senkaku flash,  the Obama administration had invested in the notion of China as a “partner.” But the Chinese leadership saw a US in decline. The US offered a hand to Beijing. It was not totally rejected, but rejected enough to wake up the Obama administration: China is not an enemy, but certainly not a strategic partner.

Suddenly, Japan came back into the picture.

     THE ASIA “TILT”: The rebalance from Iraq-Afghanistan to East Asia is real. Barack Obama is personally driving this shift in attention toward Asia. Those who know Obama know that this was on his mind from day-one of his administration. And the top tier of the National Security Council agrees. At the State Department, Clinton and her top Asia aides are fully on board.

USTR, with Wendy Cutler running the TPP policy, remain skeptical of Japan’s trade policy, but very-much open to talks. Cutler is trying to forge a consensus among key US business and labor constituencies to push ahead with TPP.

     WHAT’S NEW: For 30 years, US Asia specialists, and many strategists, have been longing for a coherent, consistent US policy toward East Asia. Not much has happened.

Only now is the US: a) really engaging ASEAN; b) not dreaming of a partnership with China; and, c) being somewhat consistent in policy toward North Korea; d) all at the same time. A clear, consistant policy.

It is this consistence and commitment to the Pacific that the US has lacked, especially on trade, but overall strategic alliances: Too willing to overlook local concerns, acting more with a sense of privilege than partnership.

     WHAT ABOUT JAPAN: The Obama Administration did a good job in response to the 3-11 earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent nuclear crisis. The basic friendship between the two countries rose to perhaps an unprecedented level.

     FUTENMA: But there is a particular problem – the US Marine presence on Okinawa – that threatens to undermine all that is good in the US-Japan alliance.

This impasse has to end.

The US-Japan alliance is critical to global stability.

But US officials are not managing the alliance with that sense of urgency, and ignore the political realities in Japan that occupy Prime Minister Noda.

The specific issue is the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been scheduled for closure for the past 16 years. Bureaucrats from the two sides agreed to build an alternative base further north, in the Henoko Bay, close to Nago city. But the local population opposed, and a stalemate ensued.

There was never a need for a new base. The US Marines have never -- ever -- explained why they need a new runway, except to privately say that the infamous Osprey might malfuction.

The solution to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) has been clear for a long time, but turf wars between the US Air Force and the US Marines have blocked a solution. And a war-torn Obama administration has failed to intervene to resolve the silly inter-service rivalry.

     THE SOLUTION: The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which includes 2,500 Marines and is tagged as ‘special forces capable,’ should remain. Those Marines would be available for quick deployments – either humanitarian relief or the securing of North Korean ports in the event of conflict. The MEU operates largely on its own, a component of, but not dependent on the total 18,000-manned 3^rd Marine Expeditionary Force. The 31^st MEU operates in close coordination with the USS Essex, out of Sasebo, in southern Japan. The helicopter unit, now based at Futenma, could be integrated into the huge Kadena air base that is managed by the US Air Force, or into a new heliport facility at Camp Hansen (US Marine), combined with pre-positioned supplies and equipment jointly maintained offshore on ships by the US and Japan. Regular joint training with Japanese forces -- and US access to Japanese facilities in the event of a regional contingency -- could be negotiated. All of the rest of the 3rd MEF could be based in Guam, Hawaii, or Camp Pendleton, close to San Diego, which will have plenty of space because of the scheduled reduction in overall Marine Corps ranks.

To soothe any fears of a US weakening its deterrent capability in the region, the US could permanently base an Ohio-class submarine, with 54 Tomahawk missiles (non-nuclear, but very powerful) at Yokosuka, and rotate strategic bombers into Misawa, in the northern part of Japan’s Honshu island.

Beijing would get the point.

The US and Japan recently completed an upgrading of the Yokosuka naval facilities, allowing for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and the upgrade makes it easy for a submarine to also be home-ported there.

With the thoughtful rebalance toward Asia underway, new basing and visitation rights can be negotiated throughout the region. The Darwin (Australia arrangement) should just be the beginning. 

This is not rocket science. 

The problem is: Prime Minister Noda's visit to the US is coming up, and the two sides have not made any visible progress on the Okinawa issue.

This is turf war among the US military at its worst. In the big picture, it makes little sense that this little Futenma base continues to cause so much trouble in US-Japan relations.

Only Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, or President Obama himself, has the power to break through this logjam.

This is no way to run an alliance.

Mike Green: ‘The Asia pivot is both political, and good policy’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan. Michael Green is professor of Political Science at Georgetown University, and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During the George W. Bush administration, Prof. Green served as senior director for the National Security Council, responsible for coordination of policy toward the Asia-Pacific.

TBL: Do you consider the ‘Asia pivot’ a new strategic initiative?

GREEN: It is a strategic recognition that Asia deserves more attention with respect to resources, and senior administration time. Secretary Clinton set that tone, very early on in the Obama administration’s first days. It makes sense because the center of international political and economic dynamism is shifting to Asia; power is diffusing, and it is shifting to Asia, especially with the rise of China and India. It makes sense for the US to play the leading role in this process. The public recognizes this. Both the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polling over the past two years documented a sense among the US public that Asia is more important than Europe and other regions.

 TBL: How does that translate into actual policy?

GREEN: It is useful to discipline the State Department and the Pentagon to send a clear signal that Asia is going to get priority. For example: In my understanding, the Pacific Command will not be cut; no matter how the Defense Department budget cuts proceed, the cuts will come out of Europe; possibly two infantry brigades, and other force structures. But it won’t come out of Asia.

That is a very important signal for the Army to hear; It is important for the State Department to hear, because USAID will have to adjust. It imposes a certain discipline on the bureaucracy.

It also sends an important message to the Asia-Pacific region, which is always worried about American withdrawal. The message: Despite the financial crisis, this administration is not going to make cuts in our Asia policy.

And, very importantly, Republicans are not challenging this. That is the good news.

 TBL: Is it a new grand strategy?

GREEN: I am a little more doubtful. It is much more political than strategic. The focus on Asia is exactly right. The term “pivot” is where I have trouble.

Superpowers don’t pivot. Global superpowers do not, even under the kind of economic pressure we are under now, enhance security by looking like they shift radically from one region to another. It violates Teddy Roosevelt’s notion of speaking softly and carrying a big stick. It oversells the whole thing.

 TBL: Doesn’t ‘superpower’ mean you can do that?

Green: Not effectively. China is overreacting. I have been in favor of maintaining a balance of power in our China relationship, but the “pivot” label came so suddenly, and so jarringly, that it created problems with China that we did not need.

 TBL: It seemed quite a different approach from the initial Obama policy.

Green: That’s right. The Obama administration started off, in 2009-2010, emphasizing more of a concert of power with China.

That’s the problem with the “pivot.” It seems to come out of nowhere, and it comes after the 2009 statement with Hu Jintao saying that we respect each other’s core interests, and after statements about strategic reassurance. We sent signals that the US would go the extra mile to cooperate with China on climate change, strategic reassurance, due respect of core interests. All of a sudden there was a jarring new agenda which makes it implicitly all about China.

 TBL: What about Europe, and NATO?

That is an important point. Europe matters enormously. In fact, Europe is incredibly important to our China policy. We need a global approach to China, and the transatlantic relationship has been critical for that.

Finally, while it looks as if the US Pacific Command is not going to be cut in the upcoming budget battles, the commander in the Pacific does not own those forces. The air and naval assets in the Pacific, if something goes hot in Southwest Asia, are shifted.

 TBL: So we need to maintain a global, rather than Pacific policy.

GREEN: Exactly. We really can’t have a hermetically-sealed region if we  are to be a global superpower. In the context of the defense cuts that President Obama is promising -- $500 billion, and maybe more – there is a lingering danger that the US Pacific force structure could be hollowed out if events get hot in the Middle East.

And we have not solved the problems in the Middle East. It is not as if we can simply turn our attention to Asia, and look away from other critical areas.

 TBL: So you are not impressed with the “pivot”?

GREEN: I think a lot of it is political. It is cover for the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a message of robust and assertive policy toward China, which I think has a political dimension because it is allowing the administration to show that it is not ‘cutting and running’ from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overall, I think the strategy is basically right, though it is not adequately resourced, and the speed with which it took place created some unnecessary problems. The rhetoric of the pivot probably hurt the strategy in some ways.

 

TBL: Would this have occurred if China had been cooperative on the Cheonan sinking, on climate change, and on currency matters?

GREEN: The Chinese brought this on to themselves to some extent because of their position on the Cheonan, on the South China Sea, the Senkakus. All of these incidents brought out animosity in Asia, a desire in the region for the US  to counterbalance China. The Chinese created the conditions where the administration, to its credit, really enhanced relationships, particularly in Southeast Asia, but with all of our allies.

I don’t think a lot of countries in the region necessarily appreciate the pivot label, because they don’t want to be implicated with us in putting a stick in China’s face. The foreign minister of Indonesia has questioned the pivot.

But there’s no doubt the Chinese made this possible.

 

TBL: You mentioned before that you think a lot of the pivot is political.

GREEEN: If you read Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s Wars, you get the strong impression that the people who wanted to get out of Afghanistan were using China and this pivot logic, without knowing a whole lot about China or Asia. So the ‘pivot to Asia’ narrative was present from the beginning of the Obama administration, but a lot of it had to do with the debate over Afghanistan.

 

TBL: But it’s not all political, is it?

GRENN: No. I think Kurt Campbell and Hillary Clinton began putting the pillars of the policy in place from the very beginning.

Let’s put it this way: China’s actions helped make the policy pivot more effective; the political desire to leave Afghanistan played a role. And some of the pillars of the pivot were being put in place from the very beginning.

TBL: If we start at India, and move down to Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and then up to Japan and Korea, there seems to be a pretty interesting network, even if informal, of new security ties. And it’s not all US-led: It’s Japan-India, or Japan-Vietnam, or even Japan-Korea.

GREEN: This is not new. This was basically the Bush Administration’s Asia strategy. The pillars were the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which we negotiated; the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative, which we began; the transformation of the strategic relationship with India; and the Armitage-Nye focus on upgrading the strategic relationship with Japan.

But I give the Obama administration a lot of credit for adding energy and substance to this process, in Southeast Asia in particular.

TBL: What about ties with India?

GREEN: The Obama administration has largely dropped the ball on India. Senior Obama officials have told Indian officials that Washington does not engage in ‘balance of power’ politics the way Bush did.

And the Obama administration had no trade agenda for the first year or two.

So the building blocks of a true regional policy are finally getting into place, but it has taken the Obama administration a long time to get this done, to get back to some of the building blocks – especially with respect to India and trade – that the Bush administration had earlier put in place.

TBL: What about Southeast Asia?

GREEN: I think Secretary Clinton in particular saw a vacuum in our Southeast Asia policy. Condi Rice had skipped two of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. Clinton filled that vacuum very quickly. and effectively, and was very welcomed, in part because of China’s much more aggressive stance in the South China Sea in 2010.

So, some of this “pivot” is new; some of it is old, but it took the Administration a while to act on existing policy.

Overall, I would say that this now amounts to a fairly solid bipartisan approach to Asia policy. This means: We should be building up our trade alliances; building up our maritime alliances.

TBL: What about China policy?

GREEN: Based on the President’s recent Asia trip, I don’t see a coherent China policy. We cannot have a policy toward China that is based only on ‘balance of power.’ We have to engage China. The agenda for cooperation was clear and robust – some people thought too robust – when Obama took office in 2009.

Now, I don’t see any engagement policy. In fact, the rhetoric toward China is a good deal more hard-line now from the Obama administration than it was under Bush, or Bill Clinton.

Chinese violations of intellectual property rights, trade restrictions, human rights violations, and cyberspace abuses are egregious, but I am not sure where the White House sees US-China relations going right now.

TBL: How will expanded maritime ties in the region affect US force structure?

GREEN: We will have more access, and be more welcomed, around the region. It is not very well-known, but we now do more naval exercises with India than we do with any other country. We do more exercises with India than India does with all other countries in the world combined.

There will be more intelligence sharing. Although India did not choose a US contender for its next jet fighter, we are actually selling India a lot of defense articles.

In India, it will not be bases; it will be deeper defense relations.

TBL: What about the rest of the region?

GREEN: In Australia, we will obviously have more access. The new facility is for all intents and purposes a base, and it will take some stress off of Okinawa. It will not replace Futenma. It will allow the Marines to send a Maritime Expeditionary Unit (MEU)), which are broadly part of the US special operations community, for very real exercises and training.

Korea, under Lee Myung-bak, is keen to maintain a hefty US presence, and he is even looking at having more regular rotations of Marines, in particular because of the Cheonan and West Sea challenges. This is not a replacement for Futenma, but there may be more rotations of Marines and naval units into Korea than before.

We will have more operations with Vietnam, and more regular visitations with the Philippines.

TBL: Are we pushing too hard, too fast?

GREEN: I wouldn’t put it that way. But we have to be careful to not overplay our hand. These relationships could change based on changes in the national leaderships of these nations. In 2004, for example, we pressed the South Korean government to give us “strategic flexibility” --  in other words, the right to use our troops based in South Korea in contingencies outside of South Korea . That was a big mistake. The South Koreans were reluctant to agree because of obvious implications for China relations. The South Koreans actually publicly said ‘no’, and the Chinese took huge comfort from that as a sign the US-ROK alliance was becoming weaker.

The lesson is that if we push too hard – if we are not sensitive to the local political conditions – we create a dynamic where we are asked to not come. We could end up with a situation in which governments are voted out of office, with new governments coming in on an explicit platform of denying or limiting US access.

TBL: Doesn’t that logic apply to Futenma?

GREEN: In a sense, yes. But the problem in Okinawa is a local government problem, not a national government problem. At the national level, Japan’s two leading parties support the US-Japan plan for Okinawa. The problem is that at the local level the opposition is becoming insurmountable.

 

Sneider: ‘I don’t see strong evidence of a serious pivot toward Asia’

 Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Dan Sneider is associate director of research at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. He formerly headed the Tokyo and Moscow bureaus of the Christian Science Monitor, and was both national editor and foreign policy columnist at the San Jose Mercury News.

TBL: Do you accept the notion that the Obama administration will shift greater focus, attention, and overall resources to the Asia-Pacific region, as the US winds down the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

SNEIDER: I was one of many people who criticized the Bush administration repeatedly for focusing too much on the Middle East and South West Asia, while neglecting East Asia. Even from a narrow security point of view that criticism was important to make, especially for those of us watching the situation in North Korea. We argued that the North Korean nuclear program was more clear and present danger than anything Iraq posed.

But not all blame should be placed on the Bush Administration. The Clinton administration, for example, did not give East Asia the importance it deserved, at least from an economic point of view.

TBL: You don’t seem very impressed with the stated new Obama policy.

SNEIDER: Northeast Asia has always been one of the primary focuses of American security policy, along with the Middle East and Europe. The rise of China doesn’t really alter that reality. We have security alliances with Japan and South Korea for a reason, and they have been there for more than half a century. I don’t see any change in that regard.

TBL: I hear a “however” coming…

SNEIDER: Yes. The Obama Administration is certainly investing not only rhetoric, but the time and energy of senior leaders on East Asia on a scale much greater than previous administrations. The President’s extensive commitment to host the APEC summit and to attend the East Asia summit all point to this trend. The administration is genuinely working to come up with a coherent policy toward the whole region, which is a major change.

However, I continue to believe that if one could draw a pie chart measuring the collective brain of the US national security establishment, you’d see that far greater amounts of time are still devoted to the Middle East and Europe, and, relatively speaking, East Asia is still not a priority.

TBL: How would you measure that?

SNEIDER: The number of people who deal with East Asia is actually pretty small, particularly those who have real depth of knowledge and experience in the region, including language skills.

I don’t yet see strong evidence that we are really going to strategically pivot away from the Middle East to East Asia. Policy makers spend a lot more time thinking about Iran than they do about North Korea. We have a stability policy in East Asia; we want to prevent conflict by maintaining a basic balance of power. But that is different from a genuine, proactive, positive policy toward the region.

I also don’t see attempts to freshly rethink how we approach the Asia-Pacific region. We pretty much have a set of policy prescriptions that we have been following for a long time. In fairness, that may be in part because those policies worked pretty well. This has meant a series of bilateral security alliances – the well-known hu-and-spokes policy, where there is no regional security architecture; the US has been the balancing power. More recently, we’ve shown a slightly greater commitment to regional security arrangements.

Toward China, we have had a hedging-engagement policy for a long time; sometimes we hedge more, and sometimes we engage more.

TBL: So you don’t see a big change?

SNEIDER: I don’t get the sense that anyone in the Administration has sat down and said: “It is really important that we rethink this region as a whole, where it is headed, and what our role is going to be.”

TBL: How does economic policy fit in this picture?

SNEIDER: I think our approach to the region, for a long time, has tended to be weighted much too much toward security in the traditional, narrow sense, and not weighted toward economic policy. The Obama Administration has undertaken some semblance of a trade policy, and that is a good thing. But, for the most part, we have assigned ourselves the role of guarantor of military balance of power as our primary function.

TBL: You see to think that our friends in East Asia want more.

SNEIDER: Yes. The fact is that many countries in the region have much more concern about the direction of US economic policy. If we don’t recover economically, and find new sources of growth for the US economy, it is not going to matter how many Marines are sitting in Darwin, Australia, or how many aircraft carriers are moving around in the Western Pacific.

The real source of the sense in the region of American decline does not come from policy makers in the region counting US ships and planes. It’s the perception that the US is unable to deal with its own economic problems, and is drifting into stagnation.

TBL: Did the Chinese and American leaderships misread each other when Obama took office?

SNEIDER: Every US administration goes through a learning curve with China. The ‘W’ Bush Administration came into office in 2001 talking about China as a threat. People tend to forget the extent of the tough talk in place when Bush came in. We had the forced downing of the American surveillance aircraft, for example. Officials pretty quickly learn that the kind of rhetoric you bring from the campaign trail into the White House doesn’t work very well when you are trying to govern.

The Obama Administration might have shown the reverse. There was some China-bashing during the campaign. But for the most part, the Administration came into office looking to engage China in a whole range of global partnership initiatives, including climate change and currency management. The view was that China was the central relationship to manage in East Asia.

The first trip the President took to China was very upbeat, and the Administration tried to push difficult issues to the side, for which he was criticized. But the efforts ran into the normal difficulties that are there: Who the Chinese are, what they want, the inevitable, relatively speaking, limits of American power in a world in which other countries are becoming stronger, and the fact that there are issues on which we cooperate with China, and issues on which we clearly disagree.

TBL: So, we misread each other?

SNEIDER: The Obama administration settled into wariness. After the 2008 financial crisis the Chinese became overbearing and arrogant, and had a sense of triumph of their system over that of the US. But in the end, both countries understand that they somehow have to manage this relationship because there is no strategy of confrontation, or even containment that works. China is far too embedded into the world economic system, and the US is too deeply engaged with China economically as well. Rhetoric that echoes the Cold War, sliding China into the role the old Soviet Union played – should not be taken seriously. It can’t be done.

TBL: Has the Obama administration learned this lesson?

The Administration has definitely gone through a learning curve with China. But I don’t think former National Security Council director for Asia, Jeff Bader, who has dealt with China for a long time, had huge illusions that we were going to enter into an alliance relationship with China and throw off our relationship with Japan.

Did the Obama administration see China as being central? Yes, because China is central. That is not an ideological statement; it is reality. The goal is to use alliance relationships to help manage China, and pull China into structures where they are forced to adhere to existing rules. That’s what the administration seems to be is trying to do.

I see this more as a natural learning curve than a dramatic shift in US policy.

TBL: What about future US force structure in East Asia?

SNEIDER: I don’t see any evidence that someone in the government sat down and said: “OK, 20 years from now, what kind of force structure do we want to have in the Asia-Pacific region? How do we want to think about that structure from the point of view of potential adversaries, crisis situations, and other possible scenarios?” I would love to see evidence that this kind of thinking is actually going on.

TBL: What about Okinawa:

I certainly don’t see any serious rethinking about the role of the US Marines on Okinawa. Until that issue is resolved, we will continue to have unnecessary tensions with Japan, our most important ally in the region.

 

Kurt Campbell: ‘We have been over-invested in Iraq and Afghanistan’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan . Kurt Campbell is assistant secretary of state for East Asian and and Pacific Affairs. He was previously co-founder of the influential think tank  Center for a New American Security, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific. Much like Mark Lippert, Obama’s nominee to run the Pentagon’s Asia Division, Campbell served as a Naval Officer through a special program that allows accomplished academics to work as senior advisors to career Naval officers. Campbell worked as a liaison to the Russiian military leadership for then-US Joint Chief of Staff Admiral William Crowe. This interview is one of four that we conducted to evaluate President Obama’s purported “pivot” toward East Asia in foreign policy.

 

TBL: What’s the best way to describe the ‘pivot’ toward Asia the Administration has undertaken? It is a return to normalcy, or is it a fundamental shift in US strategy?

CAMPBELL: There is a profound recognition that over the past 10 years, we have been primarily occupied – many would say preoccupied -- with extraordinarily important and consequential developments in the Middle East.

 This involves the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently the extraordinary developments associated with the Arab Spring. There are many reasons for us to remain consequentially involved in the Middle East and South Asia. However, by almost every measure, we have probably been over-invested in Iraq and South West Asia. And in Washington there is a profound bipartisan recognition that the lion’s share of the history of the 21^st century will be written in the Asia-Pacific, and that the United States needs to be part of that story line.

            So, what we’ve seen over the past few years is an integrated effort to first redefine and advance our bilateral security and political relationships, to work closely with emerging new partners, such as India’s “look East” strategy, Indonesia, Vietnam, New Zealand, and others. There is a clear recognition that US-China relations are essential. But most countries in the region want to see the two great nations of the region working together, even with underlying tensions and occasional challenges. It is in the interests of every country in the region to see in their own situations an improvement in relations with China. At the same time, they want the US in that picture because they believe it aids in that effort.

            As part of our overall effort, we are also committed to multilateral institutions, formally joining the East Asia summit, working to establish a formal secretariat at ASEAN, launching the US-ASEAN summit, the steps that were taken at APEC, and then the ASEAN Regional Forum all signifying a strong commitment to institution-building.

            Lastly, our ticket to the big game in the Asia-Pacific region has always been our military. Not only do we have to reposition our capabilities more to the Asia-Pacific; we also have to recognize that over the past 10 years we have invested much more heavily in land-based capabilities and on-going operations than we have expeditionary and ‘blue water’ naval capabilities, which are essentially what are necessary in the Asia-Pacific region. So we will be making those complex steps. 

Also, and Peter you this better than anyone, we need to maintain a very strong set of capabilities in North East Asia, while doing a good deal more in South East Asia. And in Australia we’ve headed down that path.

TBL: At the start of the Obama Administration, how much did the Chinese and American leaders misread each other: China thinking the US was in decline as signified by the 2008 financial crisis, and the US by thinking they could pull China into the role of a more responsible global stakeholder?     

CAMPBELL: I’m not sure there is ever a definable “beginning” in this relationship. There is a constant ebb-and-flow. The United States has to recognize, deeply and profoundly, that the US-China relationship will be the most complex bilateral relationship that we will ever experience. This requires an enormous amountof hard work, and many consultations on every conceivable matter. Even with these dialogues, the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation are very real.   

We thought it was important to send a signal that, yes, we have experienced some economic and financial difficulties in recent years, but that but that the fundamentals of our system and of our economy are very strong, and that the United States will be playing a primary role in the Asia-Pacific region for decades to come. But at the same time that our position is strong, we are prepared, willing, and able to sit down with China and other countries to figure how best to live together in peace and freedom, and maintain and advance the commerce that has sustained us all.

TBL: Is TPP a trade policy, or more the trade element of a much broader geo-strategic architecture to which you are urging a peaceful China to adhere?

CAMPBELL: It is fundamentally a trade initiative that ironically just a few months ago people questioned whether would even be possible. We were very gratified on the US side that the Korea-US trade agreement passed.  That has allowed forward momentum in a number of sectors. So we were able to announce a general framework in Hawaii.            Thus far, many of the countries that have signed on with the TPP initiative are smaller. We believe this is a high-quality agreement that has the potential to define a new way to get back to complex negotiations overall.

Since the announcement of the TPP Framework agreement at the APEC meeting in Hawaii in November, there have been a number of countries, including Mexico, Canada, Korea, and even Japan that have expressed much more interest in exploring the dynamics of the agreement, and what’s possible.

We support this. We believe it has the potential to be a standard-setting agreement, on environmental issues, labor standards issues, and other key issues that involve trade.. The idea is absolutely clear about what is expected with respect to local content, and other difficult subjects.

And by the way, the desire for high-quality or standard-setting agreements is not something that is being imposed by the United States. Many of the countries involved, including Singapore and New Zealand, are pressing for this approach.

Finally, as to your question of whether TPP is geo-strategic in nature: Although it is primarily designed for commercial purposes, as with all things this complex and important, TPP does of course entail geostrategic ramifications.

TBL: I ask about the geopolitics because a minority view in Japan tends to view TPP as some kind of American plan to gain a dominant position in important parts of Japan’s economy. Others see it as a critical way for Japan to help set the regional architecture, without which, China’s influence would only grow.

CAMPBELL: We have made clear that TPP is not something you are invited to. It is something a nation would want to aspire to. If you meet the conditions, if you are prepared to participate, then there can be a process of dialogue with the key partner. So we are not excluding anyone.

At the same time, there is a lot strategic misinformation floating around about TPP in countries where some reforms might be controversial. We think the TPP process could create the kind of connectivity among key participants that will create strong relations across the Pacific, which does nothing to “contain” any nations, but does everything to tie the United States is a much stronger way to the Asia-Pacific than ever before.

TBL: How do you expect our force structure to change in the Asia-Pacific region?

 CAMPBELL: The mantra the Pentagon uses is that we are politically sustainable, sensible, that we  are dispersed rationally, and that we work with a range of partners. I think it is undeniable that we have strong and important commitments in Northeast Asia, but that we need to work more with fiends and partners in Southeast Asia, and take the necessary steps to follow through on the commitments the President made in Australia.

So, we will see a level of American military commitment that is continuous, even in a period military downsizing, and in some places may see more naval and other capability. We think sending that message right now in the Asia-Pacific region is of central importance.

TBL: So the structure may change, but the presence overall will remain.

CAMPBELL: There will be no question that the US is determined to play a thoroughgoing, critical military role in all aspects of the challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific.

And when I say challenges, recognize I am referring to some of biggest ever, including the response to Ache, Operation Tomodachi, and ongoing efforts to respond to huge flooding in Thailand. It is the United States  first and foremost that has been deeply engaged in these efforts. One thing we are trying to do in the context of the East Asia Summit is to put in place capabilities in advance that allow other countries working with us to the inevitable natural disasters that will strike at his region.

TBL: When do you expect Prime Minister Noda to visit Washington?

CAMPBELL: The White House is responsible for specific invitations and timing, We were very happy that Secretary Clinton hosted Foreign Minister Genba here in December for an extensive meeting that helped lead to a extensive joint security declaration. We have many important things planned for 2012, including the visit of the Prime Minister, but also the celebration of the 100^th  anniversary of the cherry blossoms and they wonderful gift of the Japanese people to the United States. We’ve got several things that we would like to highlight over the course of the next several months that will send a very strong message of support from the United States of support for Japan.

TBL: Okinawa seems to be a continuing source of difficulty between the two governments, or between Okinawa and the two governments. What do you see as the best way forward?

CAMPBELL: Both governments have made an agreement to move ahead on this project. And we have worked closely with Japanese counterparts on a range of the next steps, including the landfill permit. We recognize how important it is for the Japanese and American governments to together send a message of solidarity, and of a strong security joint capability between the two sides. I think the next few months are likely to be critical, and we look forward to working with our Japanese colleagues on every dimension of the FRF issues.  

 

Lippert nomination moves along

We first reported, on March 25, 2011, that President Obama had decided to appoint one of his closest friends and advisors, Mark Lippert, to run the Asia division of the Pentagon – officially “assistant secretary of defense” for the region.

The nomination is going forward, now that Senator John McCain has lifted his hold.

McCain initially stalled the appointment, because Lippert reportedly opposed the “surge” of US troops into Afghanistan in 2009.

Lippert responded to a list of questions from McCain that the senator’s office says satisfied the senator. People close to Lippert say he was not involved in the Afghanistan policy debate.

In any case, there is little doubt that Lippert will soon be in office at the Pentagon, directing the Asia division that Obama is so concerned about. Nothing is guaranteed, of course. Other senators could hold back the nomination. But McCain was the key, the senator that others lo0ked to for  directon.

 Senator McCain’s office confirms that the senator submitted detailed questions to Lippert, and differences were resolved, at least to the point that McCain will allow the nomination to go forward.

 Lippert, a Stanford University graduate who speaks Mandarin Chinese fairly well, was Obama’s earliest foreign policy advisor when Obama arrived on Capitol Hill. Before that, he worked for Senator Patrick Leahy.

No one will comment on the record. But Lippert reportedly was involved in incidents in Afghanistan where Chinese troops arrived, and he had to negotiate with senior Chinese officers...in Chinese.

It is easy to see why Obama and Lippert get along so well; they both have a seemingly humble feature that hides a fierce determination. They interact very easily, like teammates more than political allies. Friends say they are like brothers.

The Lippert nomination is a critical part of Obama’s “pivot” toward Asia. Obama wants “his guy” to be over-seeing what the Administration says is a major change in focus of US foreign policy.

Lippert, who in a very sociable way told me he could not comment, was initially appointed as chief of staff to Obama’s initial national security director, General Jim Jones. The word from Bob Woodward was that Lippert kept undercutting Jones, using his personal connection to the President to go behind the back of his nominal NSC boss.  Lippert strongly denies this.

There is probably some truth on both sides. The Obama team is very close. But Woodward never interviewed Lippert to get his side of the story. And Lippert, saying nothing against General Jones, denies he ever undercut his boss.

In any case, Lippert is a Navy officer, appointed through a little-known program that allows acknowledged academics to serve, as part-time officers in support of career Navy officers. Kurt Campbell, currently chief of the State Departmentment’s East Asia division served in the Navy in this way. In Lippert’s case, he worked with the now-famous SEAL organization. After his disagreements with General Jones at the NSC, Lippert went back to Iraq as a SEAL. He will not comment on what he did, but it was intelligence-related.

Josh Rogin of The Cable has reported Lippert has remained on the White House pay roll.

Obamna deliberately chose Lippert for this Pentagon post. Obama wants to shift US foreign policy toward East Asia, and wants a  person in charge that he can trust.

That doesn’t mean that Lippert can have his way at the Pentagon. Indeed, there was opposition to his appointment, even among Obama supporters, who were fearful Lippert did not have the combination of policy and managerial skills to orchestrate the kind of change in US foreign policy – toward East Asis – that Obama so much favors. But Obama was insistent that he wanted Lippert; Obama really wants a “pivot” in US foreign policy toward East Asia, and he wants one of his guys to be in charge.

Senator McCain’s office confirms that McCain has lifted his hold on the Lippert nomination. Other opposition could arise, but it is unlikely.

Lippert, despite being a Stanford academic, has serious combat experience. Lippert himself will not talk about his work as a Navy SEAL. But there is no doubt that Obama listens carefully to his views.

 

Webb: ‘US and Japan paralyzed over Okinawa’

Editor’s note: The following interview was conducted jointly for Weekly Toyo Keizai, and Dispatch Japan. Senator Jim Webb, Democrat of Virginia, is chairman, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Webb is also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Along with Senators Levin and McCain, Webb has been highly critical of the 2006 plan to realign US forces in Japan. The three senators recently worked together to block funding for a large transfer of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam, arguing that the plan was unworkable, and not reflective of the current strategic environment in the region. While the Obama administration has done its best to be dismissive of these Congressional efforts, it is now clear that Pentagon is trying to adjust its plans to better conform with the Senators's goals.

TBL: The Obama Administration seems serious about a pivot of US foreign policy toward East Asia. But administrations over the past 30 years have talked about this, only to be diverted. Is it real this time?

WEBB: I’ve been writing about this, and working in East Asia for a long time.. When I was in the Pentagon in the 1980s, I think I was the first senior defense executive to say that the strategic future of the US needs to focus on East Asia, and not as much on NATO. At that time, we had 216,000 Army soldiers in Germany alone. I suggested back in 1984-1985 that we needed to start strategically rebalancing.

I have been pushing this issue every day since I arrived in the Senate. Frankly, I had quite a few discussions with Hillary Clinton about this before she became secretary of state, and then subsequent to her nomination and confirmation.

In my view, this is not so much a pivot, as it is a reestablishing of a vital strategic interest that we have in the region. Our national energy became deflected because of the way we went into Iraq, and the energy we put into Iraq and Afghanistan. So it is more of a return to normal with respect to our strategic interests.

When I came to the Senate, I worked very hard to become a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I decided that from my office, we would focus on five countries in East Asia: to reinvigorate our relations with Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore, and to work on renewing ties with a sixth country – Myanmar, Burma. That was our strategic perspective from the day I got here.

TBL: But the Administration is really committed, in your view?

WEBB: It is real, and I frankly think I have been a big part of the process. We are connecting with the governments and cultures of these countries, and we are articulating why our presence in this part of the world is important to regional stability. Over the past two years, we have seen the realities of the region affirm this perspective.

I have visited Japan many times. In February, 2010, while in Tokyo, I spoke to the National Press Club, and then went down to Okinawa. They like Americans; they like the relationship. The question of the security relationship was not as firm. DPJ leader Ozawa had made a trip to China with some 200 people.

But a short time later, in September 2010, we had the incident with China and the Senkaku Islands, and that, I think, led people in Japan and the region to start thinking in a different way.

I had warned about the Senkaku Islands in my Senate campaign, in the last debate with Senator Allen, when we were allowed to ask each other questions. The overall issue is the recognized need for a vibrant US role and for multilateral cooperation in the region, which are critical to issues such as sovereignty in the South China Sea for example, and resolution of environmental disputes along the lower Mekong River.

TBL: How does the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative fit in this picture?

WEBB: TPP is an emerging concept; ratifying itself as it goes along. But the notion of countries coming together with us in this kind of format does affirm that we should have a very strong presence in the region.

We have seen free trade agreements that China has negotiated with ASEAN and other countries that could potentially give China tariff benefits. I was a bit skeptical of TPP at the beginning, but with the countries now coming on board, I am more in favor.

TBL: Many top Japanese leaders remain skeptical about some of the economic details, but see TPP as creating a strategic architecture to which China has to respond.

WEBB: That is a valid point. I view over strategic interests in two stages. First, the Korean Peninsula. Korea is the only place in the world where the direct interests of Japan, China, and Russia intersect historically. Over the centuries, whenever one of these three has gotten a bit too much power, there has been a lot of volatility. I think that since World War II, people have come to see that the United States is the balancing force in the region. And if there is not stability in Northeast Asia, we won’t have stability in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, given the emergence of China, the best overall approach we can take is to develop multilateral systems, and to invite China to mature as a governing entity that is welcomed to participate.

 China may not do that right away. This is the 10^th anniversary of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and there are questions as to whether this has really been the benefit that many Americans thought it would be as a means of easing Chinese political rigidity.

But we now see a lot of nations saying the time has come for China to be more overt in helping other countries solve problems, rather than always taking stances that only favor Beijing.

In that context, TPP, and Mekong development, and the South China Sea are all issues where the US can facilitate multilateral approaches that add to stability.

TBL: How do you see the future of the US military force structure in East Asia?

WEBB: I believe it is important to our ability to respond that we have forward positioning of forces in East Asia. Okinawa and Guam are important in that regard. The reverse is also true: If we were to reposition our forces in the wrong way, it would send a negative signal with respect to strategic balance in the region. The US Marine Corps is uniquely suited for an immediate response anywhere in the region. I’ve worked on and studied this issue for many years, including as a defense planner. We don’t have the same force structure now that we did when I first began, obviously, particularly with respect to the size of our Navy, but the concept remains valid.

TBL: But we’ve reached an impasse with Japan with respect to a replacement for the Marine Air Station Futenma, on Okinawa. Political leaders in  Tokyo are reluctant to say the planned Henoko facility can’t move forward politically, but that is what most believe. So how does this impasse get resolved?

WEBB: You are spot on about this point. I mentioned this to Senator Levin two years ago, after a trip to the region. We have to resolve this. A resolution is critical to our strategic viability, and the issue has also become a key abrasion in Japan’s domestic politics. So this year, Senator Levin asked me to accompany him to the region. We visited Guam, Tinian, Okinawa, and Tokyo, and he came to share my concerns. Upon our return, we brought then-Defense Secretary Gates in to talk with us. He can speak can speak for himself, but I would say that he shared our view of the futility of the current approach. The question is: How to resolve the impasse in a fashion that is positive, rather than in a way that looks as if we are losing our critical presence in that part of the world?

This question belongs to the Pentagon. Inter-service rivalry and turf battles are driving a lot of the resistance. I think you quoted a Marine official in one of your articles saying completion of a new facility at Henoko would be the 8^th wonder of the world. I’ve heard similar sentiments.

TBL: Neither Tokyo nor Washington can say what each is thinking.

WEBB: The two national governments are paralyzed by these expressed positions. The only way to change is if there is a specific proposal to move toward. We can’t theorize anymore about this; it’s been going on for 15 years. That is the box they are in.

I suggested to Defense Secretary Panetta, before he visited the region in October, the idea of expanding the Naha runway facilities into a joint-use facility. That would help Japan commercially, but would also give us a mobilization fall-back. We’ve done this in Germany. We did in on Guam many years ago, which had a runway that was military on one side and commercial on the other.

This is just a thought. My point is that we do not have to be paralyzed between the existing Futenma facility and the Henoko option that doesn’t seem realistic.

TBL: Looking forward, how comfortable would you be with a bigger regional role for Japan’s defense forces, especially a marine force?

WEBB: When I studied this in the 1970s, I was in favor of Japan doing more with us in joint operations, particularly related to naval activities. My conclusion back then – admittedly a long time ago – was that Japan’s constitution did not preclude a bigger role in joint operations. But there continue to be historic issues that are not insignificant. Japan has to work out its own relationships in the region.

TBL: Will Mark Lippert be confirmed as the new assistant secretary of defense for Asia?

WEBB: I know that Senator McCain has sent a letter to him, raising some concerns. I had a private meeting with Mark after the confirmation hearings, and I was favorably impressed.

 

 

The “Asia Pivot”: Is it real?

Ever since President Obama’s extensive visit to East Asia late last year, analysts have talked about a “pivot” in American foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region. From the time Obama took office, his closest advisors talked privately about the need to “rebalance” US foreign policy, from over-emphasis on Southwest Asia (Iraq and Afghanistan), toward East Asia. But it was unclear if and when this would actually occur, and what form the new approach to East Asia would take.

 The Administration itself was divided at first; all agreed the US had to end the war in Iraq and set some kind of timetable to wind down combat operations in Afghanistan. The world’s only true superpower was tied down in wars that were exhausting the US military, draining the treasury, and overall increasingly diverting US attention from the most important strategic development: the rise of China.

 But what would a shift toward Asia look like?

The initial approach, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, and National Security Council Asia director Jeff Bader, held out hope for a ‘partnership’ of sorts with China, on everything from climate change and currency issues, to North Korea and territorial disputes in East Asia. The problem: China seemed to misread the post-2008 US as weak, and proved to be an unwilling partner.

The first big sign of trouble came in December 2009, at the Copenhagen conference on climate change, when Chinese premier Wen Jinbao seemed to go out of his way to try to humiliate Obama. The most shocking sign of trouble came in late March, 2010, when China refused to use its influence to discipline North Korea in the face of overwhelming evidence that Pyongyang sank the South Korean vessel, the Cheonan.

By July, 2010, the Obama  administration had come to see that China was not – at least not yet -- going to be a willing, responsible ‘stakeholder’ in the existing global security and economic architecture. In a speech that month at the ASEAN Regional Forum, in Hanoi, Secretary Clinton issued a nuanced but clear warning to China that territorial disputes in the region would have to be settled peacefully.

Then came the huge dispute between Japan and China, in September, 2010, over the Senkaku islands. The US takes no official stance on ultimate sovereignty, but insists that Japan is now in operational control; any change of status must occur peacefully. With little hesitation (mostly because of Kurt Campbell), the US issued clear statements that Japan’s control of the Senkaku islands fell within the bounds of the US-Japan security treaty.

The Senkaku dispute confirmed that the US no longer viewed China as a potential ally in managing global affairs, but instead as a strong competitor in a crucial region.

That does not mean a new ‘Cold War’, in this case with China.

But it meant a strong need for the US to take a true leadership role in Asia, rather than merely mouthing the 30-year mantra of Asia being a critical area and the US being a Pacific nation.

So what is the US doing? On the security side, the US Navy and US Air Force in Asia will likely be spared from upcoming huge cuts in the overall defense budget.

The US is trying to firm-up relations with traditional allies, but go beyond the usual “hub and spokes” notion with those allies to create a more flexible array of cooperative security relationships with other nations that begins to create the foundation of a true regional security architecture.

One big stumbling block is that Washington remains tied up in bureaucratic knots over basing issues with Japan. The US has mismanaged Okinawa issues with Japan so deeply that a top US official said recently: “This is a case study of how not to manage an alliance.”

But there are strong signs that, at the highest level, both Washington and Tokyo are now willing to push the Futenma issue off the immediate agenda.

Meanwhile, on trade issues, the US is pushing hard for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade arrangement (TPP), which would hopefully create a set of trade rules by which all countries in the region could peacefully engage in commerce.

No official in Washington will say this on the record, but what the US is really trying to accomplish is the creation of an environment from India, through Burma, down through Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and then up to Korea and Japan, that forces China to comply, or be the  outlier.

This is not a “containment” policy: China is simply too big, and too integrated into the world economy to somehow be pushed aside. But it is an effort on the part of the US to set the terms of debate about trade and security in East Asia.

It’s a delicate process: the ASEAN nations welcome the US presence to balance against China, but do not want to be dominated by the US.

The US and Japan continue to have a dispute over basing on Okinawa.

Is this US “pivot” toward Asia real?

Our view: Yes. People very close to President Obama say he is personally directing this move. White House officials insist that Obama has given clear direction that the “Asia pivot” be made real. The most senior administration officials – including NSC director Tom Donilon, and defense undersecretary Michelle Flournoy, are strongly on board.

Obama nominated one of his closest friends and advisors, Mark Lippert, to be assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, though Senator John McCain is holding up the Lippert confirmation. The point is that Obama wants one of his closest friends to be running Asia policy at the Pentagon.

But there are major questions, partly relating to foreign policy; Iran is going to force increasing US focus away from East Asia. And then there is the issue of institutional infrastructure: the highest levels of the US foreign policy establishment – the top levels at State, Defense, Treasury, USTR, and the NSC, have no personnel with deeply established Asia expertise. (Tim Geithner clearly knows Asia very well, but he has been so involved in domestic issues that he has had little input into the overall pivot.)

There is no tradition within the US foreign policy establishment to focus on Asia. And when the US did focus on Asia (the Vietnam War, for example), policy was run by people who knew next to nothing about the region.

When Mike Armacost became undersecretary of State during the Reagan administration, he truly knew Asia. But he was one of the few. Wendy Sherman, the new undersecretary of state, knows a good deal about North Korea and Japan, but is more of a “Hillary friend” than the type of heavyweight policy maker with the gravitas to move overall US policy.

The point is that a real “pivot” would involve many more top officials in the US government having long experience with Asia, including language skills. The US is nowhere close to that situation.

Finally, there is trade policy: TPP sounds nice, but will the US truly put in the time and effort to expand open trade with Asian nations (which will include the US having to make concessions….) It took far too long to pass the US-Korea free trade agreement. Will the same problems arise with whatever emerges from TPP?

We don’t pretend to know the answers. So we turned to four experts: Senator Jim Webb, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, former National Security Council Asia director Mike Green, and Stanford University’s Dan Sneider.

Over the next few days, we’ll print their respective comments.

 

The White House, the Marines, and Okinawa

It looks as if President Obama, during his upcoming stop in Australia, will finally announce in Darwin a long-discussed Western Australia “training option” for the US Marine Corps, which would involve regular rotation of Marine infantry units to the area, which is both well-located and held high in Australian military lore.

 The Administration will present this as part of a broader plan for a more active US strategic presence in the whole of the Pacific.

 But there still are no signs of a US policy shift regarding the USMC deployment in Okinawa. In particular, there remain no signs that the US has altered plans to try to build a much-disputed new runway in Henoko Bay, to replace the US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been slated for closure for over decade.

 To the contrary, in a bilateral meeting with Japan’s Prime Yoshikio Noda at the APEC Summit in Hawaii on Saturday, Obama reiterated US expectations for faster results on the Henoko project.

 Obama Administration officials remain locked into their now-familiar obdurate stances on Okinawa issues, despite the overwhelming consensus among specialists who follow the area that intense local opposition will never allow the project to proceed. They even show surprisingly little concern for the inevitable domestic problems the Futema/Henoko issues will cause for the beleaguered Noda, who is already trying to manage a nuclear power crisis, a devastated earthquake/tsunami zone, and burgeoning other domestic troubles. Noda even managed to drag his divided Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into regional TPP trade talks that Obama wanted to prominently promote at the APEC meeting for his domestic audience as a “jobs producing” initiative.

 Ironically, Noda may be the most promising young leader to come along in Japan in quite some time, so it would hardly seem wise for Washington to complicate his political life. But that’s what happening.

 

     DARWIN DETAILS: Details of Obama’s planned presentation in Darwin are few and far between; the White House is playing this card particularly close to the chest, all part of the “Asia Initiative” centered on this past weekend’s APEC meetings, the President’s subsequent stop in Australia, and then the East Asia summit in Indonesia.

 The White House for months has planned the regional visit this way, as Obama wants the US to be a “strategic leader” in the region, and to leverage that enhanced US regional presence to be a “job producer” at home.

 

     FORCE POSTURE: The restructuring of the US global force posture from Southwest Asia – Iraq and Afghanistan – toward the Pacific, has been a goal of the Obama White House for quite some time. There is little doubt that Obama believes this is a classic circumstance in which good policy is good politics.    

 

     OBAMA’S DILEMMA: Actually implementing such a huge shift is easier said than done. Okinawa is only one of many pieces to the puzzle, which makes it difficult to directly address.

 Inside the White House, the first order is winding down in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is happening, but with tough negotiations with Iraq, and debates with and within the US military brass about future force structure and strategy in both countries. Meanwhile, a hefty portion of the US national security establishment understandably remains focused on Iran, not to mention the Arab Spring.

 Then there are the looming cuts in the US budget, and the implications these will have on weapons systems, manpower levels, and basing – not to mention on inter-service rivalries.

 The Marines are themselves conducting a study of future roles and missions. Former Defense Secretary Gates acknowledged that the extraordinary requirements of the Iraq and Afghan wars turned the Marines into more of a traditional infantry unit than one with its usual expeditionary characteristics. The Marines are looking closely at where they will fit in the US global force posture of the next 20 years. The total size of the Marine Corps will surely be cut, which will logically lead to basing rearrangements.

 In this context, a key player in the process – someone extraordinarily close to President Obama -- acknowledged the other day in a lengthy exchange of views that the President himself has not yet given specific instructions as to how this emerging, energized East Asia policy could open the way to reworking the flawed aspects of the policy on Okinawa that are causing unnecessary tensions with Japan, the vital US ally in the region.

 So far as the over-worked, over-stretched, US national security apparatus is concerned, the US and Japan have a deal concerning Okinawa, and Japan should keep to it.

 This may be no way to run an alliance, but no one in the upper echelons of the Obama team wants to get stuck either in Washington or Japan -- in the political quicksand of Okinawa.

 At this point, the US Air Force and US Marines are – in public, anyway – so committed to the Henoko plan that only a direct order from Defense Secretary Panetta -- perhaps even the President himself would have to give the order – could break an extraordinary logjam that is causing such big troubles for the US-Japan alliance.

 A big part of the problem is inter-service rivalry between the Air Force and the Marines. The Air Force maintains at Kadena, on Okinawa, one of the largest air force bases in the world. The notion that there is not space on Kadena for the rather limited number of helicopters routinely operating from Futenma does not fly.

 Marine leaders, for their part, say they would relocate to Kadena. A skeptical top Marine General said privately recently that if the new Henoko project were ever built, “it would be the eighth wonder of the world.” Many Marines simply think it is not going to happen.

 That’s not to say the US Marine Corps has not negotiated hard for the Henoko project. The envisioned v-shaped runway would mostly be used by the flawed Osprey vertical lift-off and take-off vehicle that can transform into a fixed-wing vehicle for longer-faster flights. The vehicle has the ability to emergency land with a modified fixed-wing position in the event the vertical equipment fails. That’s the reason for the Henoko Project runway -- the root of the entire controversy.

 Many analysts agree that integration of the Futenma helicopter operations into Kadena could cause some political tension with Okinawans. But compared to efforts to build an unnecessary new runway at Henoko, the tensions would probably be small. And, as Senator Jim Webb has emphasized, there are ways to disperse some of the current heavy aircraft now present at Kadena.

 

     AUSTRALIA OPENS THE DOOR: On an optimistic note, opening the door to US Marine Corps overseas training with Pacific allies on a rotational basis could provide an opportunity to begin reconsidering the out-of-date Futenma-Henoko issue. In an excellent RECENT PAPER, Washington analysts Mike Mochizuki and Mike O’Hanlon argued, among other things, that more US Marines could deploy from the US on a routine, rotational basis, rather than so many being based on Okinawa as they are today. This would include training in Japan and elsewhere in a region in which the US is looking to expand ties and open new friendships in any case.

 Along these lines, Mochizuki wrote in an email, the existing Futenma facility could be closed, the US could preposition equipment and supplies overseas, and US Marine Corps helicopters and other aircraft could utilize existing US and Japan Self Defense facilities. There certainly would be no need for a new runway at Henoko.

 It’s only a matter of time – probably the middle of 2012 -- before the existing 2006 Roadmap to realign the US Marine Corp presence on Okinawa publicly falls apart politically. There is virtually no serious movement on Okinawa itself for implementation. An effort by Tokyo to use police or other means of coercion to forcibly begin construction would do incalculable damage to the US-Japan alliance. And on Guam itself, construction delays and cost overruns have already led senor members of the Senate to demand a new approach.

 Who know’s? The President’s Darwin speech may be an beginning.

Noda, Obama, and TPP: ‘We can work it out’…. Maybe

As next November’s APEC summit gets closer, it is increasingly clear that Washington and Tokyo are not quite on the same page with respect to trade policy. It is also unclear how the two governments will manage this rather uncomfortable diplomatic dilemma.

At issue: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade initiative, which President Obama would like to make a centerpiece of the APEC meeting, to be held in his home state of Hawaii. But Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, while supportive of TPP, has not yet been able to forge a consensus in Japan’s leadership circles in full-favor of the changes in the country’s agricultural policies that TPP involvement would entail.

The result is a mixed message from Tokyo, reflective of ongoing domestic policy debates:

First: Tokyo will give a tentative ‘yes’ to participate in the TPP negotiations, but with no prior commitments; as one Japanese official put it: “We want to find out more about TPP.”

Second: Japan will simultaneously proceed with separate free trade talks with China, South Korea, and the European Union, completely outside the TPP framework.

US officials are not happy, though some express sympathy with Noda’s domestic realities, while others – particularly those closer to Obama’s inner circle – are upset that Japan is proving ‘difficult’ at a time when a politically-beleaguered Obama very much wants to showcase his skills at job-producing economic diplomacy in Asia.

CONFLICTING AGENDAS: Obama and Noda have conflicting agendas, though the differences are nothing close to strategic in nature, and might not be irreconcilable. The problem is political and diplomatic: Obama is entering full-fledged reelection mode, and Noda faces huge domestic policy challenges. Diplomats on both sides will be working overtime between now and the APEC summit to make sure the signals sent from each side are consistent; allied.

After APEC comes an expected Washington visit by Noda, probably in January, fulfilling a long-overdue commitment from the two countries for their respective leaders to get together.

For the Obama administration, the APEC summit was supposed to be the unfolding of a big US strategic policy shift, away from over-commitment to Southwest Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan), in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and towards East Asia. For Obama personally, the APEC meeting was to have carried great personal significance: He is the first US president with such deep roots in East Asia; he wants to end one difficult chapter in US foreign policy, and finally bring the US into the much-hailed “Pacific Century,” which means heavily distributing US economic and military ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power toward the region facing the historic rise of China.

Today, with his political troubles at home well-known, Obama needs to show that his cherished vision for a new US role in Asia will deliver jobs at home.

Noda, meanwhile, faces his own set of difficult domestic problems: He’s young, in charge of a ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that has yet to prove it can effectively govern; the country’s national finances are in trouble, just when the nation needs to raise funds to rebuild the Tohoku region ravaged by last March’s horrendous tsunami; and the country faces a huge energy crisis, with public confidence in nuclear-generated power understandably shaken by the tsunami-induced crisis at the Fukushima electric facility.

Noda is compelled to focus on domestic issues. But he is proving to be a lot more shrewd than many analysts initially expected.

On TPP: Noda supports opening up Japan’s agricultural markets. Along with many reformists in Japan, including his predecessor, Naoto Kan, Noda believes agricultural reform is inevitable, and will bring many economic benefits. But he is hamstrung by domestic reality: It will take time to bring his own party, much less the whole of Japan’s ruling elite, into agreement.

But the commitment is not in doubt: Noda has maintained 200-plus person TPP team inside the prime minister’s office (Kantei), led by a veteran Foreign Ministry official but backed by key politicians, assigned the task of achieving a consensus. The key is to link opening up the agricultural market with a big program to modernize areas that might be significantly hurt by increased agricultural imports. This is a work in progress.

Beyond TPP as an economic policy, Noda maintains Kan’s view in three key respects:

First: TPP is a strategic policy; Japan and the US together should be setting the trade economic, and overall political-security agenda in Asia, to which China would then have to respond.

Second: Japan cannot go ahead with the existing plans for construction of a new US Marine facility in Okinawa. But to say so would risk terrible tension in US-Japan relations, which neither Noda nor Japan needs at this time.

Third: As a result, support for TPP has the potential benefit of winning US willingness to reduce pressure on Okinawa issues.

IMPLEMENTATION: With all of these moving, legitimate considerations on each side, diplomats will have to burn the midnight oil to avoid tensions from boiling over.

US officials, as they often say, are not clear who is running the show in Tokyo. For example: In the last week alone, the new minister for national strategy, Motohisa Furukawa, was in DC, meeting with top US officials (including Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke). Furukawa endorses both TPP and the plan to build the new US base on Okinawa.

By contrast, Japanese trade officials last week told their US counterparts in Washington about plans to move ahead with FTA talks with China, the ROK, and the EU. For Japan’s agriculture lobby, beef, sugar, wheat, and rice remain key, and the planned FTA talks would supposedly pose less of a domestic threat than would TPP.

Other key Japanese officials were also in DC last week, including a top national security advisor to Noda, who conveyed the “yes, but” position on TPP that seems to be Noda’s actual perspective at this point.

The US and Japan are by no means strategically out of alignment. But conflicting domestic agendas on the part of the respective national leaders may make for some tense moments over the next few weeks and months. And if serious disagreements do emerge before the expected Washington summit, they are likely to revolve more around Okinawa and the US Marine presence, than about trade issues.

Futenma: Push-back from Tokyo?

It may be too soon to raise any diplomatic red flags, but there are troubling signs of potentially serious tension emerging between Washington and Tokyo over stalled plans to construct a new US Marine facility in Okinawa.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda held a briefing for reporters earlier today (Friday), and denied reports that President Barack Obama had pressed for “results” on the new facility, set to be built in the Henoko Bay area of Okinawa as a replacement for the existing US Marine Air Station Futenma, which has been targeted for closure for well over a decade. Obama and Noda met on Wednesday, while both were in New York for the UN General Assembly.

During the briefing, Noda was asked directly whether Obama had spoken of expected “results.” He responded first with a gesture, tilting his head to indicate disagreement with the question, and then said: “We explained our position. We made clear our plan to move forward on the agreement reached by the two governments, and I explained that we will reduce the burden on Okinawa, and that we have to work hard to not fix the status quo of Futenma’s continuing operation, and that we will talk to Okinawa with a sincere heart. Then we received an answer: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Noda was pressed by another reporter, who quoted a US official – Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell – as having said Obama “made very clear” that “we need to see results.” Again, Noda denied this, saying: “I think the answer was: ‘We are looking forward to progress.’”

Here’s the problem: The reporter quoted Campbell accurately. In a press briefing held Wednesday following the Noda-Obama meeting, Campbell had this to say about the exchanges concerning Futenma: “We all acknowledged the challenges associated with Futenma replacement. But I think both sides understand that we’re approaching a period where we need to see results, and that was made very clear by the President.”

At the press briefing, Campbell was joined by Danny Russel, the top White House aide for Asia, who added: “On the issue of Futenma, Prime Minister Noda brought the President up to date on the Noda government position and strategy for moving forward on Futenma’s replacement facility, and both leaders shared the view that this is a priority and that there’s a great deal of important work that needs to be done. So the emphasis is on common ground and on a common effort to achieve our common goals.”

Complicating the situation is that a top Japanese official who briefed reporters after the Noda-Obama meeting indicated that Obama said that “results” are needed and that he hopes to see “progress.”

This may seem a bit of tedious, if not petty, diplomatic nuance. But it was less  than two years ago that a  disagreement over the content of an exchange between President Obama and then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama over the very same Futenma issue sparked one of the more tense incidents between the two countries in the postwar period. At the time, Hatoyama urged Obama to “trust me,” that Tokyo would try to find a resolution to the Futenma embroilment as soon as possible. But when Hatoyama later indicated that this was not necessarily a commitment to implement the existing bilateral accord to construct the replacement facility at Henoko, Hillary Clinton took the highly-unusual step of summoning Japan’s ambassador, Ichiro Fujisaki, for a dressing-down at the State Department – in the midst of a blizzard that had otherwise crippled Washington.

At the time, the incident severely frayed trust between the White House and the Kantei, and the subsequent chilly treatment accorded Hatoyama by Washington contributed to the demise of his cabinet a few months later.

     THE VIEW FROM TOKYO: What’s on Noda’s mind? Japanese officials interpreted Obama’s demeanor in the New York meeting as unusually business-like. One official who was inside the meeting reports that Obama began with a systematic listing of those bilateral issues that need a quick resolution. That was followed by the Campbell-Russel press conference, the tone of which also took Japanese officials by surprise. Correctly or not, they say they detected a hardening of Campbell’s stance, in sharp contrast to what they saw as deliberate State Department efforts to play down the Futenma issue since Hatoyama’s 2010 resignation.

Noda’s comments came on the heels of a statement by Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa that conveyed no small hint of irritation at the perceived hectoring tone of Campbell’s remarks. “When it comes to the Okinawa issue,” Ichikawa told reporters in Tokyo on Thursday, “both sides carry responsibility. It would be awkward if the two sides were to not show an attitude of working together in a harmonious manner.” Ichikawa is already on record saying that the Noda government, while committed to the Henoko plan, has no intention of imposing a deadline on talks with Okinawa aimed at winning acquiescence.

Noda and Ichikawa each have personal motivations that could help explain their respective comments following the talks with Obama. Every prime minister of Japan wants to demonstrate the ability to skillfully manage the critical US-Japan alliance, so the last perception Noda wants to take hold is that he is being pushed around by Washington. And Ichikawa, who is close to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) power broker Ichiro Ozawa, sympathizes with the view that Japan should be more forthright in expressing disagreements with Washington.

But beyond Noda and Ichikawa, a much broader array of Japanese foreign policy and political leaders are aware that the Pentagon and the White House are encountering serious obstacles to implanting the US side of the bilateral deal for Marine base realignment on Okinawa and Guam. Key members of the US Senate – Democrats Carl Levin and Jim Webb, and Republican John McCain -- have raised both budgetary and strategic concerns about the realignment plan, which could cost upwards of $20 billion. The Senate’s Appropriations Defense Subcommittee has already moved to strip the 2012 Defense budget of $155 million for construction programs on Guam designed to help pave the way for the transfer of some 8,000 Marines and family members from Okinawa.

Since Hatoyama’s resignation, the DPJ overall has been determined to allow no light between the US and Japanese sides on the Futenma issue, lest the party’s leader suffer a fate similar to that of the ex-prime minister.

Awareness of troubles on the American side has apparently allowed to seep out some of the repressed frustration in Tokyo with US demands to move ahead with the Futenma replacement project despite seemingly insurmountable opposition on Okinawa.

The Pentagon and White House have, until recently, pretended to ignore Congressional opposition to the Okinawa base realignment plan. The entire plan was initially scheduled for completion by 2014, but the two sides earlier this year acknowledged the obvious by stating the deadline would not be met. The US has placed blame for implementation delays squarely on Tokyo’s inability to overcome opposition on Okinawa, even though rising costs and construction delays on Guam have been equally responsible.

During his recent confirmation hearings to be the new deputy defense secretary, Ashton Carter received extensive briefings from Senator Levin, who chairs the powerful Armed Services Committee, and Senator Webb, who chairs the Asia subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. Webb in particular explained to Carter that overtures to alter the Okinawa base realignment plan will have to come from Washington, since Tokyo will be reluctant to risk antagonizing the US by indicating a weakening of support for the existing bilateral agreement.

     WASHINGTON MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY: It’s unclear how much of the briefing material received by Carter has made it up to President Obama. In any case, part of the apparent White House impatience stems from a desire for Japan to be fully in tune with a strategic vision for East Asia that President Obama hopes to highlight during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii in November. Part of that involves the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks, which Campbell emphasized during his New York press briefing are intended more as a strategic rather than a mere trade policy. Noda has indicated personal support for TPP, but there is no consensus yet in Japan about whether to fully participate. And part of the vision involves the US and Japan standing shoulder-to-should on alliance and regional security issues, something that is made more difficult the longer the Futenma controversy persists.

Ironically, impending major reductions in US defense spending, including likely cutbacks in overseas basing as well as personnel reductions, will almost surely impact the US force structure and basing arrangements in East Asia, including Okinawa. That could provide a face-saving chance for the US to propose a rethinking of the current plan for base realignment on Okinawa.

Unless that happens, the tension in the alliance over Okinawa that seems to be reemerging will only grow.